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SHOULD ALIENS BE INDEFINITELY
DETAINED UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1231? SUSPECT




In 1979, Kim Ho Ma's family fled their native country of Cambodia
taking Ma, who was then two years old, with them.' The family spent
the next five years in refugee camps before being granted legal entry
to the United States as refugees in 1985. Ma has lived here ever since
and, in 1987, was given the status of lawful permanent resident
In 1996, at the age of seventeen, Ma was involved in a gang-related
shooting and was convicted of first-degree manslaughter.4 Tried as an
adult, he was sentenced to thirty-eight months in prison.' After
serving twenty-six months and receiving credit for good behavior, he
was released and immediately taken into custody by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service ("INS"), which ordered him removed from
the United States under the Illegal Immigrant Responsibility and
Immigration Reform Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA") because of the
conviction. The INS could not remove him, however, because
Cambodia does not have a repatriation agreement with the United
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Martin S. Flaherty for his insight and guidance during the writing of this
Note. Also, I would especially like to thank my wife, Tara Griffin Montague, for her
support and understanding.
1. Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815,819, 821-2 (9th Cir.) (holding that because
indefinite detention of resident alien who had been ordered removed might violate
due process and international law, court would construe immigration statute as
authorizing detention only for a reasonable time, thus avoiding the constitutional
question and harmonizing the statute with international law), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct.
297 (2000) (No. 00-38), sub noni. for oral argument Kim Ho Ma v. Holder.




6. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered
sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
7. See Kim Ho Ma, 208 F.3d at 819.
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States and refused to accept Ma's return.' INS policy requires that
aliens in Ma's position be detained indefinitely unless they can show
that they are not a threat to the community and not a flight risk?
Therefore, Ma remained in INS custody until a district court ordered
him released under a writ of habeas corpus on September 29, 1999.'0
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
writ in April of 2000.11 The court held that the statute under which
the INS detained Ma did not explicitly authorize indefinite
detention. 12 Because indefinite detention of aliens raised substantial
constitutional questions and violated international law, the court
construed the statute to authorize detention only for a reasonable
time. 3
The ruling by the Ninth Circuit presents a serious challenge to the
INS' policy of indefinitely detaining aliens who have been ordered
removed under provisions of the IIRIRA. But for the Ninth Circuit's
ruling, Kim Ho Ma would still be among the estimated 4000 aliens
who have been ordered removed from the United States, but are
presently detained indefinitely by the INS because their "home"
countries will not take them back.14 Had he not been granted habeas
relief, Ma would now have been in prison for nearly five years with no
end in sight, despite the fact that his criminal sentence was satisfied
after twenty-six months. 5  This harsh policy of indefinitely
incarcerating aliens has led to riots 6 and suicide attempts among
detainees, 7 and has also prompted substantial criticism from the
international human rights community. 8
8. See id.
9. The INS detains aliens who have been ordered removed under 8 U.S.C. §
1231. See infra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
10. Kim Ho Ma, 208 F.3d at 819.
11. Id. at 818.
12. Id. at 819.
13. Id. at 820-22.
14. See Warren Richey, Liberty and Justice... For Citizens Only?, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Feb. 11, 2000. at 3. The exact number of aliens detained indefinitely is in
dispute. Although 60 Minutes also reported that 4000 aliens are currently in
indefinite detention, see 60 Minutes: INS Holds Immigrants for Deportation (CBS
News television broadcast, Mar. 26, 2000) [hereinafter 60 Minutes], the Seattle Titnes
reported the number to be 3500, see Alex Tizon, For INS, A Matter of Time, Seattle
Times, June 18, 1999, at Bi. The court in Chi Thon Ngo v. INS noted that the INS
was detaining indefinitely over 3550 aliens, including 1750 who were part of the
Mariel boat-lift in 1980. See 192 F.3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1999).
15. See Kim Ho Ma, 208 F.3d at 819.
16. See 60 Minutes, supra note 14.
17. See Yvette M. Mastin, Comment, Sentenced to Purgatory: The Indefinite
Detention of Mariel Cubans, 2 Scholar: St. Mary's L. Rev. on Minority Issues 137, 140-
42 (2000) (detailing the continued plight of Mariel Cubans detained by the INS and
calling for expanded due process protections for detainees).
18. See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of
America, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm.. 53d Sess., para. 283 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50
(1995) (expressing concern at the low level of due process protection given to aliens
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The indefinite detention of aliens is not a new phenomenon in the
United States. In fact, the practice dates back to at least the 1950s. In
1953, the Supreme Court ruled that a stateless alien, who had been
excluded from the country because he was a suspected communist,
could be indefinitely detained because allowing him entry would
present a threat to national security. 9 In the 1980s, the INS detained
thousands of Cubans who were seeking entry into the United States as
part of the Mariel boat-lift. 0 Because Cuba refused to take back
Cuban nationals whom the INS ruled excludable, these nationals were
indefinitely detained."
Most recently, the INS' interpretation of the IIRIRA has greatly
expanded the number of aliens subject to such detention!' The
IIRIRA removed longstanding distinctions between resident aliens
who had obtained entry into the United States (including both legal
and illegal resident aliens) and excludable aliens who had been
detained at the border (including aliens who had been paroled into
the United States)? Previously, excludable aliens stopped at the
border and excludable aliens who had been paroled into the United
States could be detained indefinitely, 4 while legal or illegal resident
aliens could not. According to the INS, resident aliens, who have
and the use of indefinite detention), available at http'J/www.unhchr.chltbsldoc.nsf (last
visited Jan. 30,2001); Human Rights Watch, Locked Away: Immigration Detainees in
Jails in the United States, Part I (1998) (criticizing the harsh conditions and indefinite
length of immigration detention), available at http://www.hrw.orgtreports98fus-immig
(last visited Jan. 30, 2001).
19. See Shaughnessy v. United States er rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,215-16 (1953).
20. See Mastin, supra note 17, at 143-44.
21. According to the court in Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 1750 Cubans who came to the
United States as part of the Mariel boat-lift remain in INS detention. 192 F.3d 390,
395 (3d Cir. 1999). For a discussion of the legal justifications and human toll of the
indefinite detention of these individuals, see Mastin, supra note 17.
22. Although specific numbers of aliens in indefinite detention are not available
for prior years, the number of total INS detainees has drastically increased. In 1996,
the year the IIRIRA was passed, the average daily detention population was 8592.
Cheryl Little, INS Detention in Florida, 30 U. Miami Inter-Am. L Rev. 551, 552
(1999). By 2000 the number had risen to about 20,000. See Chris Hedges, Policy to
Protect Jailed Immigrants is Adopted By U.S., NY Times, Jan. 2. 2001, at Al. Thus,
one could arguably conclude that the number of aliens being detained indefinitely has
also increased dramatically.
23. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 301, 110 Stat. 10009-546, 575 (codified at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1182(a), 1227) (classifying illegal resident aliens and excludable aliens as
inadmissible); infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. Because the distinctions are
important in understanding the constitutional jurisprudence on the rights of aliens,
this Note uses the terms "deportable" and "resident aliens" when discussing aliens
who have effected either legal or illegal entry into the country, and uses the term
"excludable" to describe aliens who have been excluded at the border, or excluded
and paroled into the country.
24. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215 (ruling that excludable aliens could be indefinitely
detained); Gisbert v. United States Atty. Gen. 988 F.2d 1437, 1443-44 (5th Cir. 1993)




lived most of their life in the United States, are now subject to
indefinite detention under the IIRIRA, in addition to aliens excluded
at the border.' These changes, coupled with the increasingly broad
range of crimes for which aliens can be deported, have significantly
expanded the number of aliens subject to indefinite detention. 6 The
Ninth Circuit's ruling, however, has resulted in a current circuit split
over whether the relevant provisions of the IIRIRA do, in fact,
authorize indefinite detention of resident aliens. 7 In addition, the
Ninth Circuit's ruling and several district court opinions call into
question whether indefinite detention of aliens violates due process
and principles of international law.' As a result, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari on October 10, 2000 to resolve these issues.29
This Note examines indefinite detention from a legal and public
policy perspective, with a focus on how indefinite detention affects the
United States' aspirations to be a global leader in human rights. Part I
outlines the statutory framework under which aliens are indefinitely
detained, the relevant constitutional principles, and the relevant
principles of international law. Part II examines the competing views
of the circuit courts as to whether the statute authorizes indefinite
detention, and whether indefinite detention is a violation of due
process or international law. Part III argues that the indefinite
detention of resident aliens violates due process as well as
international law, and that this casts a pall over the United States'
assertions that it is a leader in the field of human rights and, more
25. Under the IIRIRA, both inadmissible aliens and deportable aliens are subject
to the same "removal proceedings." See Pub. L. 104-208, div. C, § 304, 110 Stat. 30009-
546, 587, 589 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a). Thus, both excludable and deportable
aliens are subject to indefinite detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). See infra notes
38-43 and accompanying text.
26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1998); infra note 39 and accompanying
text.
27. Compare Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 821-22 (9th Cir.) (holding that
the statute authorizes detention of removable resident aliens only for a reasonable
time), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. (2000) (No. 00-38) with Duy Dac Ho v. Greene, 204
F.3d 1045, 1058-60 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the statute authorizes the indefinite
detention of removable resident aliens and excludable aliens who have been paroled
into the United States and that such detention does not violate due process under the
Fifth Amendment), and Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 297 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the statute authorizes the indefinite detention of removable resident
aliens and that such detention does not violate due process) cert. granted, 121 S. Ct.
297 (2000) (No. 99-7791). Cf Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 394-95 (3rd Cir.
1999) (holding that the statute authorizes the indefinite detention of excludable aliens
and that such detention does not violate due process).
28. See Kim Ho Ma, 208 F.3d at 822-23; Kay v. Reno, 94 F. Supp. 2d 546, 553
(M.D. Pa 2000) (holding that indefinite detention of deportable aliens violates
substantive due process); Sivongxay v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1173 (W.D. Wash.
1999) (same).
29. The Court consolidated the case Kim Ho Ma, 208 F.3d 815, cert. granted, 121




importantly, undermines its efforts to encourage compliance with
international norms. Part III also argues for a uniform approach to
aliens' rights that relies on the protections afforded all persons under
the Constitution, but that is informed by principles of international
law.
I. INDEFINITE DETENTION UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1231
In resolving issues of indefinite detention, courts have relied on
statutes, 0 INS regulations," and principles of constitutional and
international law.12 This part examines the statutory framework and
INS regulations by which the INS indefinitely detains aliens who have
been ordered removed or deported. Further, this part discusses the
constitutional due process principles and international law principles
that are relevant to evaluating the policy of indefinite detention.
A. The IIRIRA and INS Regulations
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 amended the statutes that cover the removal3 and detention'
of aliens who have committed crimes while in the United States. 5
The IIRIRA made three significant changes to the prior sections of
the Immigration and Nationality Act that are relevant to indefinite
detention. First, the IIRIRA redefined the longstanding distinctions
between excludable and deportable aliens. Previously, aliens who had
been detained at the border and denied entry were considered
excludable and retained this classification even if they were paroled
into the United States.36 Alternatively, aliens who had gained entry
either legally or illegally were considered deportable.- Under the
IIRIRA, excludable aliens and aliens who have illegally entered the
country are termed "inadmissible" and, along with aliens who have
legally entered the United States, are subject to uniform removal
proceedings. 8
30. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 287 (holding that detention of an alien was
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231).
31. See, eg., Chi Thon Ngo, 192 F.3d at 399 (holding that Interim Rules
announced by the INS were sufficient, if conscientiously applied, to withstand a due
process challenge by an excludable alien subject to indefinite detention).
32. See, e.g., Kin Ho Ma, 208 F.3d at 822-26, 829-30 (noting the serious
constitutional questions raised by the indefinite detention of resident aliens and the
clear prohibition of arbitrary detention under international law).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (Supp. IV, 1998).
34. Id. § 1231 (Supp. IV, 1998).
35. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections
of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
36. See Chi Than Ngo, 192 F.3d at 394 n.4.
37. See id.
38. See Pub. L. 104-208, div. C, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 587 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Second, the IIRIRA expanded the offenses for which aliens can be
removed or deported. Any crime that carries more than a one year
prison sentence or involves drugs or a firearm will result in removal or
deportation.39
Third, the IIRIRA mandates that aliens be removed within ninety
days once they are determined to be removable or deportable.41
During these ninety days, termed the removal period, aliens must be
detained.41 The statute further provides:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible.., removable.., or
who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to
the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may
be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be
subject to... terms of supervision .... 42
Additionally, the statute lists detailed terms of supervision for
removable aliens released from INS custody. 3
As a result of the IIRIRA, thousands more aliens are detained and
deported or removed by the INS than under previous statutes. 44 The
INS interprets the statute to allow the detention of removable and
deportable aliens at its discretion for as long as necessary.45 Because
the IIRIRA does not distinguish between excludable and deportable
aliens for the purpose of authorizing detention after the removal
period, the INS interprets the statute to allow for the indefinite
detention of aliens who were detained at the border (formerly termed
excludable), as well as for aliens who have entered the United States
legally or illegally (formerly deportable).46 As a result the INS not
39. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(2) (Supp. IV, 1998). The effects of this expansion have
been extraordinary. From 1997 to 1999 roughly 170,000 aliens were removed due to
criminal convictions. See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and
Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 Harv. L.
Rev. 1890, 1890 n.2 (2000).
40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV, 1998).
41. See id. § 1231(a)(2).
42. Id. § 1231(a)(6).
43. See id. § 1231(a)(3).
44. See supra notes 22, 39 and accompanying text. The cost of this expansion has
also been extraordinary. In 1986, the INS budget was $600 million. By 1999, it had
risen to $4.3 billion. Little, supra note 22, at 554. In 2001, President Clinton asked for
$4.8 billion to fund the agency. See Hedges, supra note 22.
45. See, e.g., Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 821 (9th Cir.) cert. granted, 121 S.
Ct. 297 (2000) (No. 00-38).
46. See e.g., Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 1999) cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000) (No. 99-7791) ("The INS argues, however, that once a
resident alien such as Zadvydas is... ordered deported and that order becomes final,
the resident alien may claim no greater rights than an excludable alien in like
circumstances."); see also Detention of Aliens Ordered Removed, Supplementary
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 40540, 40540 (proposed June 30, 2000) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. pts. 212, 236, and 241) (noting that previous statutes required deportable aliens
to be released from INS custody if they could not be deported within six months but
that this restriction has been removed by provisions of the IIRIRA and that this has
led to a considerable increase in the number of aliens who are in detention but cannot
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only indefinitely detains many more aliens under the provisions of the
IIRIRA, it also indefinitely detains aliens previously labeled
deportable who had not been subject to indefinite detention.
The INS is experiencing significant strain from the increased
number of detainees as well as from adverse court opinions that have
held that INS procedures for reviewing the ongoing detention of
removable aliens are inadequate."' As a result, the complex INS
regulations that govern the detention of aliens who have been ordered
removed but whose removal cannot be effected are currently in the
process of modification.'
The existing regulation leaves the decision of whether an alien will
be released up to the discretion of INS officials who review the
criminal files of aliens ordered removed for committing crimes."
From February to August of 1999, the INS supplemented this rule
through a series of internal memoranda known collectively as "the
Pearson memoranda" to afford indefinitely detained aliens a more
rigorous review of their status." These memoranda require review of
custody decisions before the end of the ninety day removal period,
nine months after that, and every six months thereafteri' The first
review after the expiration of the removal period requires that the
district director of the INS (or his or her designated subordinates)
conduct an interview with the detainee."2 This review and alternate
subsequent reviews are also subject to review by INS headquarters."
In all of these proceedings, detained aliens must show, through clear
and convincing evidence, that they are not a threat to society or a
flight risk.' Moreover, the Department of Justice recently issued a
be removed from the country).
47. See Detention of Aliens Ordered Removed, Supplementary Information 65
Fed. Reg. 40540, 40540 (proposed June 30, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 212.
236, and 241) (citing the increase in the number of aliens detained, the lack of a time
limit on detention, and the ruling in Kim Ho Ma as reasons for expanding the review
process for deportable aliens detained beyond the statutory removal period).
48. See id.
49. See Apprehension and Detention of Aliens Ordered Removed, 8 C.F.R.
§ 241A(a). The rule states:
The district director may continue in custody any alien inadmissible... or
removable under.., the Act... beyond the removal period, as necessary,
until removal from the United States. If such an alien demonstrates by clear
and convincing evidence that the release would not pose a danger to the
community or a significant flight risk, the district director may, in the
exercise of discretion, order the alien released from custody on such
conditions as the district director may prescribe ....
Id.
50. See Detention of Aliens Ordered Removed, Supplementary Information 65
Fed. Reg. 40540, 40540 (proposed June 30, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 212,
236, and 241); Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390,399-401 (3d Cir. 1999).
51. See Chi Thon Ngo, 192 F.3d at 400.
52. See id
53. See id-
54. See id at 400-01.
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proposed rule that incorporates and expands upon the procedures
outlined in the memoranda." The proposed rule requires that all
decisions to detain an alien more than ninety days beyond the initial
removal period be made by a centralized office, called the
Headquarters Post-Order Detention Unit ("HQPDU").56 Under the
proposed rule, the district director or the Executive Associate
Commissioner from the HQPDU may release an alien "if the alien
demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General or her
designee that his or her release will not pose a [risk to the community
or a risk of flight pending removal.]" 7
The INS bases these regulations on the authority vested in the
Attorney General under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6),58 which the INS
interprets as authorizing the detention of aliens for as long as
necessary.59 Ordinarily, courts grant substantial deference to agency
interpretations of the statutes that they administer.' Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council held that if congressional intent is
not clear from the statute, the court will defer to the agency's
interpretation if it is reasonable. 61 Because the indefinite detention of
aliens raises substantial questions of constitutional and international
law, however, two venerable canons of statutory construction apply.
Under the principle of constitutional avoidance articulated in
Ashwander v. TVA,6' courts must interpret ambiguous statutes so as to
avoid reaching substantial constitutional questions. 63  Moreover,
55. See Detention of Aliens Ordered Removed, Supplementary Information 65
Fed. Reg. 40540, 40540-41 (proposed June 30, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts.
212, 236, and 241).
56. See id. at 40541.
57. Detention of Aliens Ordered Removed, 65 Fed. Reg. 40544 (proposed June
30,2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 241).
58. See Detention of Aliens Ordered Removed, Supplementary Information 65
Fed. Reg. 40540, 40541 (proposed June 30, 2000) (to be codified at 8 CFR pts. 212,
236, and 241); supra note 42 and accompanying text.
59. See Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 821 (9th Cir.), cert granted, 121 S. Ct.
297 (2000) (No. 00-38); Detention of Aliens Ordered Removed, Supplementary
Information 65 Fed. Reg. 40540, 40541 (proposed June 30, 2000) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. pts. 212, 236, and 241).
60. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer....").
61. See id. at 843 ("[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.").
62. 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
63. See id.; see also Int'l Assoc. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961)
("Federal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their
constitutionality."); United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1957) (citing
Ashiwander and Benson and construing a statute narrowly so as to avoid the
constitutional questions that might be raised by allowing the Attorney General to
question deportable aliens about matters unrelated to their availability for
deportation); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) ("When the validity of an act
1446 [Vol. 69
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under Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy,' an ambiguous
statute must be interpreted so as to comply with international law.'
Even though agency interpretations are given deference under
Chevron, the Court has indicated that the older and more venerable
Ashwander and Charming Betsy canons still trump agency
interpretations when applicable. 66 For example, a few years after
Chevron was decided, the Court overruled the National Labor
Relations Board's interpretation of a statute on the basis of the
Ashwander doctrine, and it cited Charming Betsy as the root of that
doctrine.67 The doctrine of avoidance prevents needless confrontation
of constitutional questions and, more importantly, it stands for the
of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.").
64. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
65. See id. at 117-18.
66. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991) (noting that the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance applied to agency regulations by holding that the regulations
in question did not present the kind of grave constitutional concerns that might
require avoidance); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988) (holding that agency's interpretation of
National Labor Relations Act was not entitled to deference where that interpretation
raised serious constitutional questions).
67. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575 (White. J.). Although Justice
White did not explicitly lay out how the roots in Charming Betsy grew into the forest
of constitutional avoidance, it could be surmised that Charning Betsy rests on a
presumption that Congress generally does not intend to violate international law,
because that law binds the nation and has domestic effect, see Curtis A. Bradley, The
Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of
International Law, 86 Geo. L.J. 479, 495-97 (1998), and thus the Constitution, which
also binds the nation and has domestic effect, deserves at least the same
consideration. There are other similarities between the doctrines. Charming Betsy
may be influenced by an understanding that courts are obligated to act as "agents of
the international order" and where possible, construe statutes to conform to that
order. See id. at 498-99 (quoting Richard A. Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the
International Legal Order 72 (1964)). Courts have a similar obligation to enforce the
Constitution; indeed both treaties and the Constitution are the "supreme Law of the
Land." U.S. Const. art. VI; see infra notes 1613-84 and accompanying text. Finally,
Charming Betsy has been associated with the understanding that international law is
closely related to natural law. See Bradley, supra at 494-95. Inasmuch as the United
States Constitution protects natural rights, international law and constitutional law
spring forth from the same universal principles, which are entitled to deference. See
id.; cf Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.) ("An [act] of the
Legislature (for I cannot call it law) contrary to the great first principles of the social
compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority." (emphasis
removed)). But cf. id. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring). Justice Iredell surmised:
The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest
and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court
could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature
(possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the
opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural
justice.
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proposition that courts should presume that Congress is performing its
duty to uphold the Constitution.61
The Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan raised some ambiguity as to
the applicability of the Ashwander doctrine in cases involving agency
interpretations.69 In that case, the Court applied Chevron deference
to Health and Human Services regulations that prohibited abortion
counseling in any federally funded facility in spite of the constitutional
questions raised."v However, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, did not question the continued validity of the Ashwander
doctrine.71  Rather, he found that the constitutional questions
presented by the government regulation were not serious or grave
enough to warrant the application of Ashwander.72 The Court's
unwillingness to apply Ashwander may have signaled a retreat from
that doctrine where agency interpretations are involved, 3 or perhaps
only an eagerness to address the constitutional issues presented by
Rust,74 or a genuine belief that no serious constitutional question was
presented.75 The last two possibilities seem to be the most plausible in
light of the Court's recent decision, also written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers.76 In that case, the Court struck down
the Army Corps of Engineer's interpretation of the Clean Water
Act,77 noting that administrative interpretations are not entitled to
deference where such interpretations raise substantial constitutional
questions." The Court stated that in such instances, it would construe
statutes to avoid constitutional questions, unless such a construction
was "plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."79
68. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575.
69. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 190-91.
70. See id. at 186-91.
71. See id. at 190-91.
72. See id. at 191.
73. Such a retreat seems unlikely, however. See id. at 204 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting, joined by Marshall & O'Connor, JJ.). Justice Blackmun noted:
The majority does not dispute that '[f]ederal statutes are to be so construed
as to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality.' Nor does the majority
deny that this principle is fully applicable to cases such as the instant ones in
which a plausible but constitutionally suspect statutory interpretation is
embodied in an administrative regulation.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
74. See id. at 204-05 ("[I]n its zeal to address the constitutional issues, the majority
sidesteps this established canon of construction with the feeble excuse that the
challenged regulations 'do not raise... grave and doubtful constitutional
questions....').
75. But see id. at 205 ("This facile response to the intractable problem the Court
addresses today is disingenuous at best.").
76. No. 99-1178, slip op. (U.S. Jan. 9,2001).
77. See id. at 11.
78. See id. at 12.
79. Id. (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const.




In addition to the statutory and regulatory framework under the
IIRIRA, the U.S. Constitution also provides guidelines that are
relevant to evaluating the policy of indefinitely detaining aliens. The
Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall be... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"' which protects
people in the United States from violations of both substantive due
process and procedural due process."' The Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the states from violating these rights. -
Substantive due process protects those rights "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" and prevents government conduct that
"shocks the conscience."'  The Supreme Court's decisions on exactly
which rights are protected by due process, however, have not always
been consistent.' Through a long line of cases applying the due
process protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to the states, the
Court has extended substantive due process protection to most of the
rights protected in the first eight amendments s as well as to the right
to marital privacy86 and the right to an abortion before the third
trimester.' When determining whether a right is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, the Court considers "(1) the text of the
Constitution and the original intent of the [Framers]; (2) the history
and traditions of [the United States]; (3) the political philosophy or
moral philosophy [of] any just society ...." The Court also takes
highlights a new wrinkle in the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Chief Justice
Rehnquist indicates that constitutional avoidance takes on a more prominent role
when an administrative interpretation potentially infringes on states' rights. See hL at
12 ("This concern is heightened where the administrative interpretation alters the
federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state
power.").
80. U.S. Const. amend. V.
81. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
82. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .....
83. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (citations omitted).
84. Compare Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause did not protect against double jeopardy in
a state criminal trial because such a protection was not implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty), with Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969) (holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause incorporated the protection against
double jeopardy).
85. See e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to
jury trial); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Eighth Amendment
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures); Fiske
v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (First Amendment right to freedom of speech).
86. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
87. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
88. John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 438 (6th ed. 2000);
see also Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication -
A Survey and Criticism, 66 Yale L.J. 319, 328 (1957) (discussing four primary sources
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into account whether a right is best protected by the courts or by the
legislature.89 The right to be free from detention has been recognized
as a fundamental liberty interest, a right implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."
To prevent the government from engaging in conduct that shocks
the conscience, any infringement on a fundamental right must survive
strict scrutiny. That is, the infringement must be narrowly tailored to
further a compelling government interest.91  Detention does not
survive this scrutiny and is a violation of substantive due process if it is
for the purpose of punishment without a trial.' Civil, non-punitive
detention, however, is not a violation of due process if it is applied to
achieve a compelling end and is narrowly tailored to reach this end. 3
The Court has held that detention without bail prior to trial is
justified-provided there is a hearing-by the compelling government
interest in preventing certain dangerous defendants from committing
crimes while released on bail, where the detention is strictly limited to
defendants facing particular charges and is for a limited time.94 The
Court has also ruled that civil detention passes the strict scrutiny test
where the detainee is shown through a hearing to be insane and a
danger to the community.9
If a government action that deprives an individual of life, liberty, or
property survives substantive due process review, it must still comply
with the requirements of procedural due process.9 Procedural due
process requires that the procedure by which a person is deprived of
life, liberty, or property be fair.' In the context of a criminal trial, this
requires, among other things, that there be proof beyond a reasonable
doubt before a defendant is punished.9 In the context of commitment
the Court has looked to: "(1) the opinions of the progenitors and architects of
American institutions; (2) the implicit opinions of the policymaking organs of state
governments; (3) the explicit opinions of other American courts that have evaluated
the fundamentality of [the right]; or (4) the opinions of other countries in the Anglo-
Saxon tradition").
89. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 88, at 439.
90. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (White, J.) ("Freedom from
bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause.. .. "); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (Rehnquist,
J.) ("On the other side of the scale.., is the individual's strong interest in liberty. We
do not minimize the importance and fundamental nature of this right.").
91. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (Scalia, J.) ("[Substantive due
process] forbids the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at
all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.").
92. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746.
93. See id. at 755.
94. See id.
95. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 81-82.
96. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746.
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 493 (1895) (Harlan, J.) ("No
man should be deprived of his life under the forms of law unless the jurors who try
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to a mental institution, the government must show clear and
convincing evidence in a hearing that a person is a threat to himself or
to society before he can be detained.99 In the context of welfare
benefits granted by statute, a person is entitled to an administrative
hearing and to confront witnesses before those benefits are taken
away.1°°
The degree of process that must be provided depends on the nature
of the right or interest asserted.101 For example, a person's liberty
interest in being free from bodily restraint" is stronger than his or her
property interest in welfare benefits granted by statute. 3 Basically,
the strength of the right asserted dictates the measure of process that
is due.1°4
The Fifth Amendment is also generally understood to incorporate
equal protection as a function of due process." If an infringement on
a right or interest is based upon a suspect classification, it must pass
strict scrutiny review.1 6 Whether a classification is suspect depends
on whether it targets groups that are "discrete and insular minorities"
subject to democratic process breakdown'-that is, a group that is
vulnerable to the dictates of the majority and has also been, to some
degree, excluded from the political process. The Supreme Court has
granted this protection to racial minorities""l and, to a lesser extent,
women.
109
him are able ... to say that the evidence before them... is sufficient to show beyond
a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged."); Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 88. at 553.
99. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 81-82.
100. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,267-68 (1970).
101. See id. at 262-63; Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21,34 (1982).
102. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.
103. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8.
104. See id. at 263-64. Compare the Court's test in Mathews v. Eldridge-
More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct
factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). See also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1991)
(applying a similar test to a statute providing for civil attachment procedures between
private parties).
105. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,27 (1995).
106. Id.
107. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
108. See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to
invalidate a statute that prohibited interracial marriages on the grounds that there
could be no legitimate purpose to such a prohibition).
109. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (requiring that distinctions based on




Historically, however, aliens have not fared well under due process
analysis. In the late nineteenth century, the Court decided a series of
now infamous cases involving the exclusion of Asian immigrants."0
These cases established the plenary power of the legislative and
executive branches to regulate immigration,"' which the government
has subsequently invoked to deny aliens the protection of due
process.112 Notably, the power to enact immigration laws is not
enumerated in the Constitution. 113 The Court, however, based this
power on principles of international law and natural law that entitled
sovereign nations to control their borders."' Thus, the power over
immigration was understood to be essentially a function of foreign
relations, the province of the federal government, and more
specifically, the political branches." 5
110. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893).
111. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century
of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 853-54 (1987)
[hereinafter Henkin, Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny]; Maureen Callahan
VanderMay, The Misunderstood Origins of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 35
Willamette L. Rev. 147, 151-52 (1999).
112. See e.g., Zadvydas v. Underdown 185 F.3d 279, 289 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000) (No. 99-7791) ("[Tjhe governmental power to exclude
or expel aliens may restrict aliens' constitutional rights when the two come into direct
conflict."). But see Vandermay, supra note 111, at 165 (arguing that this
understanding of the plenary power doctrine is based on a misreading of the cases
establishing the doctrine).
113. See Henkin, Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, supra note 111, at 858.
114. See Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659. The Court stated:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has
the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to
forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only
in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.
Id.; see also Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603-04 ("That the government of the United
States... can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think
open to controversy.... It is a part of its independence."). The Court in Chae Chan
Ping went on to justify this notion of sovereignty, quoting Chief Justice John
Marshall:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any
restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a
diminution of its sovereignty .... All exceptions, therefore,... must be
traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other
legitimate source.
Id. at 604.
115. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713 ("The power to exclude or to expel aliens,
being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the political departments
of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress....");
Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659 ("[The power over immigration] is vested in the
national government, to which the Constitution has committed the entire control of
international relations .... It belongs to the political department of the government,
and may be exercised either through treaties made by the President and Senate, or
through statutes enacted by Congress .. ").
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From its inception, the plenary power was subject to some
constitutional limitations. In fact, each of the decisions that
established the plenary power doctrine contains language indicating
that the power over immigration, while exclusive to the executive and
legislative branches of the federal government, was limited by the
Constitution.116 Furthermore, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,"" the
Court noted that aliens present in the United States, although subject
to deportation by Congress, were protected by the "safeguards of the
Constitution.""' A few years later, in Wong Wing v. United States,"'
the Court ruled that, although Congress could exclude or expel aliens
for whatever reasons it prescribed, it could not impose punishment in
the form of imprisonment at hard labor on aliens without a trial, as
this violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution.2 '
In the 1950s, the Supreme Court decided another series of cases
that expanded the deference courts would give the legislative and
executive branches in regulating immigration, while at the same time
acknowledging the constitutional limits of this deference. Each of
these cases involved regulations that restricted the rights of aliens
under the guise of national security, in order to protect the country
from communist infiltration. In 1950, the Court in United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy2 1 ruled that excludable aliens had no
constitutional rights with regard to their application to enter the
country.122 Two years later, in Carlson v. Landon," the Court held
that aliens could be held without bail during deportation
116. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713 ("The power to exclude or to expel
aliens.., is vested in the political departments of the government. .. except so far as
the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by
the paramount law of the Constitution, to intervene."); Nishinura Ekht, 142 U.S. at
660 ("An alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any such officer claiming
authority to do so under an act of Congress, and thereby restrained of his liberty, is
doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is
lawful." (italics in original)); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604 ("The powers to declare
war, make treaties ... and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship, are all
sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise only by the Constitution itself and
considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of
all civilized nations.").
117. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
118. Id at 724.
119. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
120. See id. at 233-34. The Court further noted that just as the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment applied to all persons, including aliens, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, so too did the protections of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. Id. at 238.
121. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
122. See id at 542-43. The Court further noted that the power to exclude aliens is
rooted in the foreign affairs power. Ild. at 542 ("The right to do so stems not alone
from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign
affairs of the nation."); see also supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
123. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
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proceedings.124 Although the Court invoked the plenary power
doctrine, it noted that "[t]his power is, of course, subject to judicial
intervention under the 'paramount law of the Constitution."' ' 25 The
Court, however, found no due process violation because the purpose
of detention during deportation proceedings was not punishment, but
rather was to effect deportation and to protect the public from
communist sympathizers. 6 Yet the Court was careful to note that it
was not addressing the issue of prolonged detention.2 7
Prolonged detention was at issue a year later, however, when the
Court decided Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei.'18 Building
on the ruling in Knauff, the Court held that an excludable alien, who
was stateless and had no country to which he could return, could be
detained indefinitely on the basis of secret evidence. 9 The Court's
ruling rested on two propositions: first, that "the power to expel or
exclude aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the
Government's political departments largely immune from judicial
control;"'30 and second, that "[i]n the exercise of these powers,
Congress expressly authorized the President to impose additional
restrictions on aliens entering or leaving the United States during
periods of international tension and strife."'' The Court reasoned
that the government's need to control the country's borders and
protect its citizens during times of crisis justified the continued
detention of excludable aliens without a hearing. 32  The Court,
however, distinguished between deportable aliens, who had entered
the United States either legally or illegally, and excludable aliens, who
were detained at the "threshold of initial entry."'33 Aliens who had
entered the country could only be expelled after proceedings that
satisfied constitutional due process requirements. 34 On the other
hand, aliens who had been stopped at the gate, so to speak, were
subject to exclusion without constitutional due process protection.3 '
The Court further noted that the detention of an excluded alien on
American soil does not afford her any constitutional rights. 36 She is
considered to be legally excluded from the country, even though she is
physically within the country. 37 This has come to be known as the
124. See id. at 545-46.
125. Id. at 537 (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893)).
126. See id. at 54142.
127. See id. at 546.
128. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
129. See id. at 207, 214-16.
130. Id. at 210.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 210-11.
133. Id. at 212.
134. See id.
135. See id.




"entry fiction." '138 Relying on this "fiction," the Court held that
excluded aliens who are detained in the United States do not gain any
constitutional rights by virtue of their presence.1 9
The current reach and limitations of the plenary power doctrine are
uncertain. Shortly after the decision in Mezei, the Court employed
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to hold that the Attorney
General was not authorized to require aliens to answer questions
unrelated to their availability for deportation as part of a program of
supervision while they were awaiting deportation.'"' The Court noted
that allowing these questions would raise "issues touching liberties
that the Constitution safeguards, even for an alien 'person' ...... , In
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong 42 the Court refused to extend the
plenary power to allow a regulation promulgated by the Civil Service
Commission that would have prevented aliens from holding most
138. See e.g., Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 397 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[Tjhese
holdings are based on the fiction that 'detention is not punishment,' and the 'entry'
fiction that an excludable alien 'stands at the border' even when he has been
physically present within the country for years.").
139. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215. Mezei and its "fictions" did not win by a landslide.
In fact, Justices Black, Douglas, Jackson, and Frankfurter all dissented vigorously.
Justice Black wrote:
The Founders abhorred arbitrary one-man imprisonments. Their belief
was-[and] our constitutional principles are-that no person of any faith,
rich or poor, high or low, native or foreigner, white or colored, can have his
life, liberty or property taken 'without due process of law.' This means to
me that neither the federal police nor federal prosecutors nor any other
governmental official, whatever his title, can put or keep people in prison
without accountability to courts of justice.
Id. at 218.
In his dissent, Justice Jackson argued that the indefinite detention of Mezei was no
longer a means of exclusion, but rather an alternative to exclusion. See id. at 227.
Jackson thought that Mezei's detention clearly constituted a deprivation of liberty
that was protected by due process. See id. at 222-23. Jackson argued that although
Mezei's detention might be justified if it was essential to the safety of the state, and
thus it could survive substantive due process review, see id. at 223-24, such detention
would still have to comply with procedural due process, which required at least a fair
hearing with fair notice of the charges. See id. at 227-28. He remarked, sardonically:
Because the respondent has no right of entry, does it follow that he has no
rights at all? Does the power to exclude mean that exclusion may be
continued or effectuated by any means which happen to seem appropriate to
the authorities? It would effectuate his exclusion to eject him bodily into the
sea or to set him adrift in a rowboat. Would not such measures be
condemned judicially as a deprivation of life without due process of law?
Suppose the authorities decide to disable an alien from entry by confiscating
his valuables and money. Would we not hold this a taking of property
without due process of law? Here we have a case that lies between the
taking of life and the taking of property; it is the taking of liberty. It seems
to me that this, occurring within the United States or its territorial waters,
may be done only by proceedings which meet the test of due process of law.
Id. at 226-27.
140. See United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194,201-02 (1957).
141. Id. at 201.
142. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
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government jobs. 43 The Court held that aliens were entitled to equal
protection under the law 144 and invalidated the regulation on the
grounds that it was not sufficiently related to immigration policy, nor
was it justified by speculative assertions that it would promote
administrative efficiency. 145 In sum, the Court's jurisprudence on the
plenary power seems to afford the political branches of the
government some deference where a statute, regulation, or practice is
closely related to immigration policy. This deference is strongest
where the governmental act deals with excludable aliens. These aliens
may be excluded, even at the cost of constitutional rights that are
guaranteed to all persons.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have passed on the opportunity to
further define the parameters of the plenary power doctrine. In 1993,
the Court ruled that unaccompanied juvenile aliens had no
substantive due process right to be placed in the custody of a willing
private custodian rather than remain in the custody of the INS.'46
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, noted that "in the exercise of its
broad power over immigration and naturalization, 'Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."' 47
Nonetheless, the Court recognized that aliens present in the United
States were afforded substantive and procedural due process
protection, but held that the right asserted was not a fundamental one,
since all children are in one form of custody or another.4 8 In 1999, the
Court held that a group of illegal aliens could not bring a selective
prosecution challenge to deportation proceedings against them. 49
Justice Scalia, rather than relying on the plenary power doctrine,
noted that the bar for selective prosecution claims was high in criminal
cases, and higher still in deportation proceedings because deportation
was not punishment. 50 Justice Scalia did point to foreign policy
considerations involving immigration that made the government's
interest more compelling.15" ' However, he avoided explicit discussion
of the plenary power.5 2
C. International Law
International law also provides standards relevant to determining
the lawfulness of the indefinite detention of aliens. International law
is derived from three principle sources: (1) treaties or international
143. See id. at 101-02.
144. See id at 102-03.
145. Seeid. at 115-17.
146. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1993).
147. Id. at 305-06 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)).
148. See id. at 301-03.
149. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999).
150. See id. at 489-91.
151. See id. at 490-91.
152. See id.
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agreements; (2) international custom; and (3) the "general principles
common to the major legal systems of the world."'5 3 Of these, treaties
and international custom are the main sources of international law.',
Treaties create binding obligations between parties in international
law. Also, treaties may create obligations enforceable domestically
and may contribute to customary international law. 55
"Customary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states [generality] followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation [opinio juris]."'56  States may opt out of a developing
customary international legal practice by clearly and consistently
indicating their intent not to be bound to international custom.'
United States courts generally ascertain principles of customary
international law "by consulting the works of jurists, writing
professedly on public laws; or by the general usage and practice of
nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law."''t '-
International law binds the international community of states. I",
Also, many states incorporate international law into their domestic
legal systems.60 The United States, in addition to being bound
internationally, incorporates international law into domestic law.'6'
International law enforced domestically consists primarily of treaty-
based law and customary international law.b 2
The U.S. Constitution grants the authority to incorporate treaties
into domestic law. According to the Constitution, "all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."' -1 Interestingly, the treaty
power, not unlike the plenary power doctrine, allows the federal
153. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102
(1987) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)]. Judicial decisions and the writings of
scholars have also been considered a fourth source of international law. See Statute of
the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S.
No 993, 3 Bevans 1179, 1224 (1945). United States courts generally consider these
factors as a means of discerning customary international law.
154. See Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Hunian Rights Law in Domestic
Courts, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 367, 368 (1985) [hereinafter Lillich, Invoking International
Law].
155. Restatement (Third), supra note 153, § 102 cmt. f.
156. Id. § 102(2).
157. Id. § 102 cmt. d.
158. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1b0); see also Jama v. INS, 22 F.
Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998) (citing United States v. Smith and finding that abuse of
immigration detainees was a violation of customary international law and thus
actionable under the Alien Tort Claims Act).
159. Restatement (Third), supra note 153, pt. 1. ch. 1, introductory note.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162- See id.; Lillich, Invoking International Law. supra note 154, at 368.
163. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
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government to reach beyond some of the limitations placed on it by
the Constitution, particularly those involving the powers reserved to
the states. 64 The treaty power, however, does not allow the federal
government to infringe on the rights guaranteed to individuals
through the Bill of Rights.
1 61
Treaties that are self-executing, that is, treaties not requiring
implementing legislation by Congress, are considered federal law and
trump prior inconsistent statutes under a last-in-time principle. 16"'
Therefore, self-executing treaties are enforceable in U.S. courts, but
they may be overruled by a subsequent statute.1 67 Treaties that
require implementing legislation are considered non-self-executing,
and are not enforceable in U.S. courts until Congress has passed
legislation to implement them.168 Another way to view this distinction
is as between those treaties "that require an act of the legislature to
remove or modify the courts' enforcement power (and duty)" (i.e.
self-executing), and "those that require an act of the legislature to
authorize judicial enforcement" (i.e. non-self-executing) . 69
The determination of whether a treaty is self-executing or not rests
generally on: (1) the intent of the parties; (2) whether the treaty, by
164. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920) (holding that the need for
the nation to speak with one voice in foreign affairs justified federal enforcement of a
treaty that infringed on the powers reserved to the states under the Constitution).
165. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that Congress' powers are
limited by the Bill of Rights and noting that treaties are also subject to this
limitation).
166. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) ("[A self-
executing treaty] can be deemed... the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed
or modified at the pleasure of Congress. In either case the last expression of the
sovereign will must control."); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) ("Our
constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it
operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision."); Lillich, Invoking
International Law, supra note 154, at 368. The basic premise of the last in time rule is
that a treaty can be overruled by a statute and vice versa. The later of the two will be
controlling.
167. See supra note 166. The orthodox view that treaties are, with some
exceptions, see infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text, self-executing and directly
enforceable in U.S. courts has come under recent criticism. See John C. Yoo,
Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original
Understanding, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (1999) (arguing that the Framers of the
Constitution did not intend treaties to have domestic effect without implementing
legislation by Congress). But see, Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical
Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land", 99
Colum. L. Rev. 2095 (1999) (arguing that a careful examination of history shows that
the framers did intend treaties to be self-executing, in large part to ensure swift
compliance by the Nation to international obligations); Carlos Manuel Vizquez,
Laughing at Treaties, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2154 (1999) (arguing that the text, structure
and doctrine of the Constitution clearly give treaties status as domestic law).
168. See Foster, 27 U.S. at 314; Lillich, Invoking International Law, supra note 154,
at 368.
169. Carlos Manuel Vzquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89
Am. J. Int'l L. 695, 696 (1995) [hereinafter, Vfzquez, Four Doctrines].
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its terms, addresses obligations to the legislature; (3) whether the
treaty requires action, such as the appropriation of funds, which can
only be accomplished by the legislature; and (4) whether it confers a
cause of action on an individual seeking to enforce the treaty17' In
recent years, the United States has signed several human rights
treaties, but it has attached declarations that they are non-self-
executing. 71 In the absence of such declarations, these treaties would
probably be self-executing given consideration of the above factors
because, by their terms, they create readily enforceable rights and do
not require implementing legislation." - However, lower courts have
accepted less explicit indications of intent of non-self-execution as
controlling and presumably will accept explicit non-self-executing
declarations as controlling." Commentators, on the other hand, have
criticized these declarations as inconsistent with two important
purposes of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause: to avoid conflicts
with other nations resulting from treaty violations, and to enlist the
judiciary in carrying out international treaty obligations.7
Additionally, non-self-executing declarations create unjustifiable
conflict between the United States' obligations under international
law and its domestic law.'75 Even if a treaty is non-self-executing, it is
still the supreme law of the land, and the political branches of
government-Congress and the President-have an international and
constitutional obligation to implement legislation or regulations to
take care that the law is executed. 76
In addition to consistently declaring treaties non-self-executing, the
United States has also recently ratified several human rights treaties
subject to extensive reservations, understandings, and declarations,
which affect the substantive content of the obligations undertaken
pursuant to these treaties." Under international law, a reservation is
a unilateral statement made by a party state when entering into a
treaty that limits or modifies the legal obligations undertaken by that
170. See id. at 696-97.
171. See id. at 706 & n.54.
172. See ik
173. See Vd.zquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 169, at 707.
174. See id. at 708 & n.61.
175. See Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 31 Geo. Wash. J.Int'l L
& Econ. 49, 75 (1997); Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding "'Fraudulent" Erecutive Policy:
Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 42
DePaul L. Rev. 1257, 1257-59 (1993).
176. See Restatement (Third), supra note 153, pt. I ch. 1, introductory note; Jordan
J. Paust, Customary International Law and Hunian Rights Treaties are Law of the
United States, 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 301,322-35 (1999).
177. See David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declarations and Hunan Rights Treaties, 24 Yale J. Int'l L 129, 139 (1999);




state.178 States may enter reservations to a treaty unless: (1)
reservations are generally prohibited by the terms of the treaty; (2) a
particular reservation is one which is prohibited by the treaty; or (3)
the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty. 179 Declarations and understandings also modify the obligations
that a state purports to enter into under a treaty.180 A declaration can
have the same effect as a reservation, but, if it modifies or limits the
obligations of a state, it is subject to the same limitations as a
reservation.' 81  An understanding, on the other hand, is an
interpretation of the agreement a state makes in a treaty."2 If an
understanding reflects the accepted view of the agreement, it is
valid. 83 If an understanding is contrary to the purpose of the treaty,
however, another state party that is not willing to accept it may
challenge that understanding. 184
Customary international law is also enforceable in U.S. courts. "'
Although customary international law is not explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution, the Supreme Court has held that "[i]nternational law
is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."'8 6
Customary international law has the same status as treaty law and
trumps prior inconsistent statutes.17 However, subsequent federal
statutes, and in some cases judicial and executive acts, can overrule
customary international law. 18  Even so, some customary
178. Restatement (Third), supra note 153, § 313 cmt. a.
179. Id. § 313.
180. Id. § 313 cmt. g.
181. Id.
182. See Restatement (Third), supra note 153, § 313 cmt. g.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
186. Id.; See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964)
(confirming that international law is federal law); Henkin, Chinese Exclusion and its
Progeny, supra note 111, at 865-66 (noting how the incorporation of international law
into U.S. domestic law has its roots in the corresponding status of international law in
English law and the law of the American Colonies); Beth Stephens, The Law of our
Land Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 Fordham L. Rev.
393 (1997) (defending the position that international law is federal law, not common
law, and thus still enforceable in federal courts and binding on the states).
187. Lillich, Invoking International Law, supra note 154, at 368.
188. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 ("[W]here there is no treaty, and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations...."); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446,
1454-55 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the controlling act of the Attorney General, an
executive officer, as well as the judicial act of the Court in Mezei, precluded the
international law prohibition against prolonged arbitrary detention from being
applied to the indefinite detention of excludable Cuban aliens). But see Henkin,
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, supra note 111, at 873-85 (arguing that the notion
that customary international law can be preempted by legislative, executive and
judicial acts is based on dicta, and has never been supported by a Supreme Court
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international law is considered to be so universally accepted and
fundamental that it cannot be legally overruled or derogated from.
These principles of international law are known as jus cogens.1"' For
example, genocide is considered to be a violation of jus cogens.'1'
In addition to applying treaty-based law and customary
international law directly, U.S. courts invoke international law in the
interpretation of federal law. 9' In 1804, Chief Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, held that "an act of congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible
construction remains."'" Since that time the Charming Betsy doctrine
has been consistently invoked to harmonize congressional statutes
with principles of international law. 3 This doctrine allows courts to
effect the presumed will of Congress to legislate consistently with
international law and to fulfill the judicial branch's obligation to apply
international law."l
The United States has entered into several treaties that give rise to
international obligations that potentially conflict with the indefinite
detention of aliens. While these treaties may or may not be directly
enforceable in United States courts because they may or may not be
self-executing, the United States is obligated internationally by the
terms of these treaties. Also, the terms of these treaties are evidence
of customary international law, which is directly enforceable in U.S.
courts.195
In 1945, the United States signed and ratified the United Nations
Charter, 96 "a multilateral treaty to which virtually all states are
parties."'" The U.N. Charter lists one of its central purposes as
"promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion."'98 In addition, the Charter obligates states to
promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all.. ."' and "to take joint and separate
holding).
189. Restatement (Third), supra note 153, § 102 cmt. k.
190. See id § 702 cmt. n.
191. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804); supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
192. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118.
193. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint, Corp., 466 U.S. 243. 252
(1984) (noting that in the absence of clear congressional intent, the Court would
assume that international obligations under a treaty had not been abrogated or
modified).
194. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Geo. Li. 479,495-99 (1997).
195. See Restatement (Third), supra note 153, § 102 cmt. i.
196. See Lillich, Invoking International Law, supra note 154. at 371.
197. Henkin, Human Rights, supra note 177 at 320.
198. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
199. Id. art. 55.
2001] 1461
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
action" to accomplish these goals."' The human rights and
fundamental freedoms that are protected by the U.N. Charter are
generally understood to be those listed in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights ("Universal Declaration"). 201  These include the
right to "life, liberty and security of person, '' 2 2 the right to
personhood,203 the right to "equal protection of the law, '2° and the
right not to be arbitrarily detained.0 5
While the U.N. Charter is a treaty that the United States has signed
and ratified, and is thus the supreme law of the land, whether it is
enforceable domestically is a subject of debate. 6 In 1952, the
California Supreme Court overruled a lower state court's decision,
which had held that the U.N. Charter was self-executing. 2 7  In
overturning the decision, the court remarked that "[t]he charter
represents a moral commitment of foremost importance, and we must
not permit the spirit of our pledge to be compromised or disparaged
in either our domestic or foreign affairs. We are satisfied, however,
that the charter provisions relied on by plaintiff were not intended to
supersede existing domestic legislation. .. 20.
Lower courts have come to accept the view that the U.N. Charter,
and through it, the principles of the Universal Declaration, are non-
self-executing, although the Supreme Court has never addressed the
issue. 9 Indeed, the California Supreme Court's ruling has been
criticized on the following grounds. First, critics argue that the
provisions of the Charter should be read broadly and not strictly
limited by the original intent of the drafters, just as broad provisions
of the U.S. Constitution have been expanded over time to protect
individual rights.210 Second, given the development of human rights
laws and norms, the human rights provisions of the Charter arguably
are now less vague than the California court maintained in 1952.211
Third, even if all of the rights in the Universal Declaration are not
self-executing through the Charter, the provisions of non-
200. Id. art. 56.
201. See Restatement (Third), supra note 153, § 701 cmt. d; Lillich, Invoking
International Law, supra note 154, at 378. The Universal Declaration enumerates
rights thought to be universal to all persons. See Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration], reprinted in
International Human Rights Documentary Supplement, at 17 (Richard B. Lillich and
Hurst Hannum eds. 1995).
202. Universal Declaration, supra note 201, art. 3, at 18.
203. Id. art. 6, at 18.
204. Id. art. 7, at 18.
205. Id. art. 9, at 18.
206. See Lillich, Invoking International Law, supra note 154, at 376.
207. See Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 722-25, 242 P.2d 617, 620-22 (1952).
208. Id. at 724-25, 242 P.2d at 622.
209. See Lillich, Invoking International Law, supra note 154, at 376.
210. See id. at 377.
211. See id. at 377-78.
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discrimination are now sufficiently defined to be considered self-
executing.212 Fourth, when the United States signs and ratifies a
treaty, each department of the government is obligated to carry into
effect the terms of the treaty. Therefore, the judicial branch, as a
department of the government, is obligated to give effect to the terms
of U.S. treaties within its jurisdiction.21 Fifth, the test for determining
whether a treaty is self-executing has developed since 1952.214 Under
a more recent test, which focuses on whether a treaty provides "'direct,
affirmative, and judicially enforceable rights," 211 a court might
determine that the U.N. Charter is self-executing.2t
Regardless of whether the U.N. Charter is self-executing, the
principles enumerated in the U.N. Charter and the Universal
Declaration contribute to the understanding of customary
international law. In fact, the principles of the Universal Declaration
are generally considered to be part of customary international law
among nations.217
The United States also signed and ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") in 1992.2t' Under
this treaty, every person within the jurisdiction of a party state has
"the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subject to
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are
established by law. '219 In addition, "[elveryone shall have the right to
recognition everywhere as a person before the law." -' The ICCPR
also provides for equal protection of the rights of individuals.-21 These
rights, however, with the exception of the right to personhood before
the law, may be derogated from to the extent strictly required to
maintain public order in time of emergency.-'
212. See id at 379.
213. See id. at 380.
214. See id. at 380-82.
215. Id. at 381 (quoting People of Saipan ex reL Guerrero v. United States Dept. of
Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974)).
216. See id. at 382.
217. See id. at 394-96; Restatement (Third), supra note 153, § 701 cmt. d. (-[l~t is
increasingly accepted that the states parties to the Charter are legally obligated to
respect some of the rights recognized in the Universal Declaration."), Henkin,
Human Rights, supra note 177, at 322 ("It is also commonly accepted that at least
some of the provisions of the [Universal] Declaration were, or may have become,
obligations under customary law.").
218. Henkin, Human Rights, supra note 177, at 784.
219. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR] reprinted in International Human Rights Documentary Supplement, supra
note 201, at 33, 36.
220. Id. art. 16, at 39.
221. Id. art. 2, at 34.
222. Id. art. 4, at 34-35.
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In signing the ICCPR, the United States attached an understanding
that allows discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or other
distinctions when it is rationally related to a legitimate government
interest.23 Moreover, the United States attached a declaration that
the ICCPR is non-self-executing."2 4  While these limitations
potentially diminish the international obligations undertaken by the
United States,2z the ICCPR still contributes to, and, to a certain
extent, reflects the substance of customary international law.226
The United States is also party to the Charter of the Organization
of American States ("OAS"). 27 The OAS is part of the regional
Inter-American human rights system.2 8 Through its membership in
the OAS, the United States is generally considered to be bound to the
terms of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
("American Declaration").2 9 The American Declaration protects the
right to life, liberty and security,210 the right to equal protection,231 the
right to personhood before the law, 2 and the right to due process. 3
The rights protected under the American Declaration may be binding
as incorporated through the OAS Charter or as an indication of
customary international law norms.' The Inter-American system
also includes the American Convention on Human Rights
("American Convention").235 The American Convention protects the
right to recognition as a person before the law, 36 freedom from
223. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Administration's
Proposed Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, reprinted in Richard B.
Lillich and Hurst Hannum, International Human Rights: Problems of Law, Policy,
and Practice 251, 252 (1995) [hereinafter Lillich, International Human Rights].
Notably, the rational relationship required in this understanding is lower than the
strict scrutiny review of suspect classifications compelled by U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence.
224. Id. at 253.
225. See supra notes 171-84 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
227. Henkin, Human Rights, supra note 177, at 524.
228. Id. at 523-24.
229. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX,
adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, 1948 [hereinafter
American Declaration], reprinted in International Human Rights Documentary
Supplement, supra note 201, at 137; see Henkin, Human Rights, supra note 177, at
343; Susanna Y. Chung, Prison Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth
Amendment Violations, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 2351, 2381-82 (2000) (arguing that
international human rights standards, including those under the American
Declaration, have given rise to an evolving standard of decency that obligates the
United States to improve prison conditions).
230. American Declaration, supra note 229, ch. 1, art. I, at 138.
231. Id. art. II, at 138.
232. Id. art. XVII, at 140.
233. Id. art. XXVI, at 142.
234. See Henkin, Human Rights, supra note 177, at 343.
235. See id. at 523-24.
236. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969,
pt. 1, ch. 2, art. 3, O.A.S.T.S., No. 36, at 1, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into force July 18.
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punishment other than for a crime3 7 the right to personal liberty and
security, which includes the right to be free from arbitrary
imprisonment, and the right to equal protection of the law."
Although the United States has not ratified the American
Convention, there is some support for the proposition that it further
clarifies the obligations of all parties to the OAS."kI The American
Convention grants expanded authority to the Inter-American
Commission to review violations of the American Convention and the
American Declaration committed by OAS members. - 1 Therefore, as
a member of the OAS, the United States is subject to review by the
Commission. 42 Additionally, the American Declaration and the
American Convention are further evidence of customary international
law norms. 243
These treaties, in addition to being directly enforceable to one
degree or another in United States courts, indicate emerging
customary international law norms that are relevant to the indefinite
detention of aliens. These norms include the right to personhood, the
right to liberty, the right to be free from prolonged arbitrary
detention, the right to due process and the right to equal protection.2'
Of these, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States recognizes that prolonged arbitrary detention and
systematic racial discrimination are violations of customary
international law 45 and perhaps even violations of jus cogens.2 '
However, customary international law is constantly developing, and it
is therefore possible that the Restatement's understanding of
customary international law is outdated and thus incomplete.2'
Moreover, the Restatement itself emphasized that its understanding
was conservative, erring on the side of under-inclusion.2
Whether the indefinite detention of aliens violates these norms has
not been conclusively decided. United States courts have generally
1978) [hereinafter American Convention], reprinted in International Human Rights
Documentary Supplement, supra note 201, at 145, 146.
237. Id. art. 5, at 146-47.
238. Id. art. 7, at 147.
239. Id. art. 24, at 152.
240. See Henkin, Human Rights, supra note 177, at 343, 523-24.
241. See id at 523-24.
242. See id. at 524.
243. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 201-39 and accompanying text.
245. Restatement (Third), supra note 153, § 702(e)-(f).
246. See id § 702 cmt. n.
247. See id. § 702 cmt. a.
248. Id. ("This section includes as customary law only those human rights whose
status as customary law is generally accepted (as of 1987) and whose scope and
content are generally agreed. The list is not necessarily complete, and is not
closed...." (citations omitted)); see Richard B. Lillich. Remarks, 1985 Am. Socy.
Intl. L. Proceedings 84, reprinted in Lillich, International Human Rights, supra note
223, at 163 (noting that the list in the Restatement is a "'cautious one").
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recognized that the customary international law prohibition against
prolonged arbitrary detention is in conflict with the indefinite
detention of aliens.249 However, this has not always resulted in judicial
enforcement of the norm." Furthermore, the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, a body of the United Nations, considers
detention arbitrary either when there is no legal basis for the
detention or when the detention results from a process that does not
comply with international standards for a fair trial.2 5' In addition, the
Human Rights Committee, a body created by the ICCPR to review
states' compliance with that treaty, expressed concern at the lower
degree of due process protection given to excludable aliens and the
indefinite detention of aliens in the United States.1 2 Also, Human
Rights Watch, a non-governmental organization, argued that the
detention of immigration detainees violates international norms when
aliens are held indefinitely and are not informed when, or if, they will
be released. 11 Thus, even if the detention was initially legal, it
becomes prolonged and arbitrary by virtue of its indefiniteness. 4
The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to
decide the substantial questions of what protections are owed to aliens
under the United States Constitution and international law.255 The
Court agreed to resolve a circuit split between the Ninth and Fifth
Circuits regarding whether the current immigration statute authorizes
the Attorney General to detain indefinitely both excludable and
deportable aliens. 6 Part II describes this circuit split.
249. See e.g., Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795-800 (D. Kansas, 1980)
(looking to several international human rights treaties, including the Universal
Declaration, The American Convention, and the ICCPR to identify a customary
international law prohibition against prolonged arbitrary detention and holding that
the indefinite detention of aliens violates this prohibition), affd on other grounds sub
nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
250. See e.g, Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454-55 (1lth Cir. 1986) (holding
that acts of the Attorney General were controlling executive acts that preempted the
application of the international law prohibition against prolonged arbitrary
detention).
251. See Fact Sheet No. 26, The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, § IV(B),
available at http://www.unhrchr.ch/htmllmenu62/fs26.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2001).
252. See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of
America, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., para. 283, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/79/Add,50
(1995), available at http://www.unhchr.chltbs/doc.nsf (last visited Jan. 30, 2001).
253. See Human Rights Watch, Locked Away: Immigration Detainees in Jails in
the United States, Part III. (1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/us-immig
(last visited Jan. 30, 2001).
254. See id.
255. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 691466
INDEFINITELY DETAINED
II. THE CIRCUIT COURTS' DECISIONS REGARDING INDEFINITE
DETENTION UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1231
Circuit courts are currently in disagreement over whether the
IIRIRA permits the indefinite detention of deportable aliens and
whether such detention violates the Fifth Amendment and/or
international law. Both the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit
directly addressed the indefinite detention of resident aliens under the
provisions of the IIRIRA. The Fifth Circuit ruled that resident aliens
could be detained indefinitely under the IIRIRA, -' while the Ninth
Circuit held they could not? 8 In a related ruling, the Tenth Circuit
recently held that excludable aliens could be detained indefinitely
under the statutory predecessor of the IIRIRA,29 and presumably the
IIRIRA,26 and that resident aliens could be detained indefinitely
under the IIRIRA,261 and arguably, its predecessor statute.'2 The
Tenth Circuit further held that indefinite detention of excludable and
resident aliens did not violate due process.' Additionally, the Third
Circuit recently held that excludable aliens could be detained
indefinitely under the IIRIRA as well as its predecessor,'1 provided
that the INS followed its newly supplemented regulations for
reviewing the necessity of detention.' The split between the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits is now before the Supreme Court."' This part
examines the differing views of these circuit courts on the statutory
interpretation of the IIRIRA, due process and international law,
which have led to the circuit split.
A. Interpretations of 8 U.S.C § 1231
The contrary holdings of the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit rest
on differing readings of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which provides that
"[a]n alien ordered removed who is inadmissible... removable.., or
257. Zadvydas v. Underdown 185 F.3d 279. 286-87, 297 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000) (No. 99-7791).
258. Kim Ho Ma v. Reno 208 F.3d 815, 818-19 (9th Cir.). cert. granted, 121 S. Ct.
297 (2000) (No. 00-38).
259. Duy Dac Ho v. Greene, 204 F3d 1045, 1055 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
indefinite detention of excludable aliens was clearly authorized by former 8 U.S.C. §
1226(e) (1994)).
260. Id. at 1056 (noting that if the current 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6) were applicable, it,
too, would authorize the indefinite detention of excludable aliens).
261. Id. at 1057 (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) authorized the indefinite
detention of deportable aliens).
262- Id. at 1054 (noting that, arguably, former 8 U.S.C. § 1252 might apply and
would authorize indefinite detention of certain deportable aliens).
263. Id. at 1060.
264. Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390,394-95 (3d Cir. 1999).
265. See id. at 399. The INS supplemented its current regulation with a series of
internal memoranda, known as the "Pearson memoranda," which provide for more
rigorous review of prolonged detention. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
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who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be
detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject
to... supervision."267 The Fifth Circuit held § 1231(a)(6) to be an
unambiguous grant of authority by Congress to the INS to detain
those aliens who could not be removed for as long as necessary,
subject to the district director's discretion as outlined in the Pearson
memoranda. 21 The Fifth Circuit's reading is in accord with that of the
Tenth Circuit, which held that § 1231 expressly granted the Attorney
General the authority to detain deportable aliens at her discretion
without any time limit.269 Also in agreement, the Third Circuit has
held that § 1231 contains an express grant of authority to the Attorney
General to detain excludable aliens indefinitely. 7 °
The Ninth Circuit read 8 U.S.C. § 1231 differently. The court found
that, on its face, the statute did not authorize an indefinite period of
detention, nor did it require a time limit on detention.2 1 The court
noted that the INS' interpretation of the statute, which would have
allowed for indefinite detention, was not entitled to Chevron
deference because of the serious constitutional questions raised by
that interpretation.272 To avoid a potentially unconstitutional result,
the court interpreted the statute to authorize detention for a
reasonable time only.273 The court further held that where there was
no reasonable likelihood that a deportable alien could be repatriated
in the reasonably foreseeable future, the INS was not authorized to
detain an alien beyond the removal period.74 The Ninth Circuit
reached this interpretation because: (1) it avoided the constitutional
question of whether indefinite detention of aliens who had entered
the United States (i.e. deportable aliens) violated due process; (2) it
comported with the language of the statute and avoided a harsh result
which was not expressly authorized by the statute; (3) it was consistent
with prior readings of similar statutes in the Ninth Circuit; and (4) it
was more consistent with international law.275
267. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1998).
268. See Zadvydas v. Underdown 185 F.3d 279, 286-87 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
121 S. Ct. 297 (2000) (No. 99-7791); supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
269. See Duy Dac Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1056-57 (10th Cir. 2000).
270. See Chi Thon Ngo, 192 F.3d at 394-95.
271. Ma v. Reno 208 F.3d 815, 821-22 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000)(No. 00-38).
272. Id. at 821 n.13; supra notes 60-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
relationship between Chevron deference and the avoidance doctrines.
273. Kim Ho Ma, 208 F.3d at 821-22.





The Fifth and the Ninth Circuits also reached contrary conclusions
on the degree of due process protection afforded to resident (i.e.
deportable) aliens. In Zadvydas v. Underdown52 the Fifth Circuit
held that resident aliens, once ordered removed, had the same right to
due process protection as excludable aliens, and could thus be
indefinitely detained.2" The Fifth Circuit based its ruling on the
plenary power outlined in the Asian exclusion cases, United States ex
rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy and Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel
Mezei.278 The court found these cases to stand for the proposition that
the federal government is free to act in the immigration sphere
without judicial scrutiny.279 The court noted that both resident and
excludable aliens were entitled to substantive due process protection
when those rights did not conflict with the government's plenary
power to regulate immigration.' The court held, however, that
where the violation of an alien's constitutional rights is incidental to
the exercise of governmental power over immigration, the violation is
an "acceptable price to pay."'21 The court distinguished Wong ling v.
United States' on the grounds that Wong Wing stood for the
proposition that aliens could not be subject to punishment without a
trial, which would violate their substantive due process rights, because
such punishment was not related to their deportationY3 In Zadvvdas,
the Fifth Circuit reasoned that detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 was
not punishment and was a necessary step in effectively deporting
aliens and protecting citizens from criminal activity.-
The Fifth Circuit further noted that the distinction between
excludable and resident aliens that was apparent in Mezei2~ was not a
substantive bright line distinction.' Rather, the only reason resident
aliens would have more substantive due process rights than excludable
aliens was because, having entered the country, they have more
opportunity to assert rights in matters unrelated to immigration.2'
276. 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000) (No. 99-7791).
277. See id. at 297.
278. See id at 288-89; supra notes 110-35 and accompanying text (discussing how
these cases established the plenary power of Congress to regulate immigration).
279. Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 288.
280. See id. at 289, 294-95.
281. Id. at 289.
282. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
283. See Zadvydas 185 F.3d at 289-90; supra notes 119-20 (discussing Wong Wing
and the limits it places on the government's treatment of aliens).
284. Zadvydas. 185 F.3d at 289-90.
285. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (describing the heightened
constitutional protections available to resident aliens, as opposed to excludable
aliens).
286. Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 294.
287. See id. at 294-95 ("Since many will never enter the country or will do so only
briefly, they will have little opportunity to assert [constitutional] rights in matters
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The court held that resident aliens did have a right to a higher degree
of procedural due process regarding the determination of whether or
not they should be removed from the country3m Once resident aliens
have been ordered removed, however, they stand on the same footing
as excludable aliens, and their substantive right to be free from
detention is subordinate to the government's interest in regulating
immigration.29
The Fifth Circuit's ruling accords with recent rulings of the Tenth
and the Third Circuits. The Tenth Circuit, in Duy Dac Ho v.
Greene,2" held that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the
indefinite detention of either resident or excludable aliens.2 9' The
Tenth Circuit reasoned that an order of removal places all aliens on
the same footing: that of an excludable alien seeking entry into the
country. 292 The court found that the right that aliens are asserting in
this situation is the right to be allowed into the country, not the right
to be free from detention.293 Furthermore, the court held that because
aliens have no right to enter the country, they have no right to be
released from detention.29 The court also noted that any heightened
due process protection held by resident aliens involved only the
process by which they are determined to be removable.2 95
In a forceful dissent, Judge Brorby remarked that the majority's
ruling rested on "a tenuous foundation of legal fiction stacked upon
legal fiction. ' 296 Judge Brorby pointed out that freedom from bodily
restraint was a fundamental right and that any infringement on that
right must be subject to strict scrutiny; requiring a compelling
government interest and narrowly tailored means.2 7 Judge Brorby
distinguished legislative and executive immigration policy, which he
viewed as entitled to deference under the plenary power doctrine,
from indefinite detention, which he saw as a means by which
Congress' directives are carried out.298 Therefore, he argued that, to
unconnected to the plenary power.").
288. Id. at 295.
289. See id. at 295-96.
290. 204 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2000).
291. Id. at 1059-60.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1058.
294. Id. at 1060.
295. See id. at 1059.
296. Id. at 1061 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 1062.
298. See id. at 1062 n.1 (citing to Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 (W.D.
Wash. 1999)). Interestingly, Judge Brorby also noted that "[t]he dangers at which the
detention scheme is directed, chiefly the prevention of flight and the protection of the
community pending deportation of aliens who have been convicted of crimes, involve
domestic interests rather than international concerns." Id. (quoting Phan, 56 F. Supp.
2d at 1155). His point seems to be that inasmuch as the plenary power is based on the
foreign affairs power of Congress, see supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text, the
plenary power doctrine does not support deference to legislation that is basically
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survive strict scrutiny, the need for detention must be proportional to
the likelihood that deportation could be effected, the dangerousness
of the individual detainee, and the risk of flight. I Moreover, Judge
Brorby argued that this balancing test should be applied to both
excludable and deportable aliens in the same manner. "
The Third Circuit's ruling dealt with the indefinite detention of
excludable aliens. The court, in Chi Thon Ngo v. INS;'1 held that
excludable aliens, including excludable aliens who had been paroled
into the United States, could be indefinitely detained, as long as there
were adequate procedures in place to ensure that the detained aliens
were, in fact, a danger to the community and a flight risk '-- The court
based its ruling on the plenary power of the political branches of the
government to regulate immigration" 3 and it reasoned that the
constitutional rights of excludable aliens could not restrict the right of
the United States to deny them entry into the country.' The court
held, however, that even excludable aliens have a liberty interest that
is protected by due process.3°s Because of this, the court held that
when excludable aliens face prolonged detention, they must be
granted periodic reviews that carefully scrutinize whether the
justification for their detention is still valid.'' That is, there must be a
meaningful review of whether they are still actually a danger to the
community or a flight risk.-' 7 The court held that while the previous
INS regulations were not adequate, the interim rules in the Pearson
memoranda were sufficient.3 0 In sum, the Third Circuit's holding
asserted that excludable aliens have no fundamental right to be free
from detention where that right conflicts with the government's power
to control immigration, but that they do have a liberty interest which
entitles them to some degree of procedural due process in
determining whether their detention is justified. The court was
careful to point out that its ruling did not apply to deportable aliens?2
domestic.
299. See Duy Dac Ho, 204 F.3d at 1062-63 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 1063 n.3.
301. 192 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1999).
302. See id. at 398-99.
303. See iL at 395-96.
304. See id
305. Id at 396. Interestingly, the court noted that even excludable aliens were
persons entitled to substantive due process, but did not discuss whether aliens had a
fundamental right to liberty, and it did not engage in strict scrutiny review. Rather,
the court went straight into a review of procedural due process. analyzing the
adequacy of the procedures by which detention is reviewed. See id. at 396-99.
306. Id. at 398.
307. See id.
308. See id at 398-99.
309. Id. at 398 n.7.
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In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in Kim Ho Ma v. Reno,"' found that
the indefinite detention of resident aliens raised substantial
constitutional questions. As a result, the court interpreted the statute
to authorize the detention of deportable aliens only for a reasonable
time beyond the removal period.3 11 Further, the court held that where
there is no reasonable likelihood that an alien's country of origin will
accept her return in the foreseeable future, the statute does not
authorize any detention beyond the removal period .31  The court
recognized that the law was settled on allowing the indefinite
detention of excludable aliens who had not yet entered the territory of
the United States.313 However, the court did not view the cases
supporting this proposition as justifying the indefinite detention of
aliens who had entered the United States either legally or illegally.
The rulings supporting the indefinite detention of excludable aliens
relied on the entry fiction, which justified withholding constitutional
protection from aliens who were not considered to be within the
territory of the United States.314 In contrast, aliens who have entered
the country and begun to develop the ties that come with permanent
residency are entitled to protection under the Fifth Amendment." 5
The court cited to Wong Wing v. United States316 for the proposition
that even aliens who have been ordered deported are entitled to
substantive due process.31 7 The court also noted that extending the
entry fiction to aliens who had gained entry would mean "strip[ping]"
them of constitutional protections which they had previously been
granted.1
In addition, the court stated that it was not clear to what degree the
plenary power applied to indefinite detention, and it cited to relatively
recent Supreme Court decisions for the proposition that the plenary
power doctrine is subject to constitutional constraints.3 9 In light of
these substantial constitutional questions, the court interpreted the
statute to avoid a construction that would allow for the indefinite
detention of deportable aliens.2
310. 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. (2000) 297 (No. 00-38).
311. See id. at 818-19; supra notes 62-79 and accompanying text (discussing the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance in statutory interpretation).
312. Kim Ho Ma, 208 F.3d at 818-19, 821-22.
313. See id. at 823.
314. See id. at 823-25.
315. See id. at 825.
316. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
317. Kim Ho Ma, 208 F.3d at 826.
318. See id.
319. Id. at 826 n.24 (citing to Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) and Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) for the
proposition that the plenary power does not apply in all cases, and that when it does,
it is subject to constitutional contraints).




The Fifth and the Ninth Circuits also arrived at different
conclusions with regard to the applicability of international law
proscriptions of arbitrary detention. The Fifth Circuit, while noting
that it did not believe the detention at issue was arbitrary, held that
the applicability of international law was precluded by its previous
decision in Gisbert v. United States Attorney General."' In that case,
the court held that international law proscriptions of arbitrary
detention were preempted in the United States by a combination of
executive, legislative, and judicial acts that authorized the indefinite
detention of excludable aliens.3"-' As a result the Zadvydas court held
that although the alien in Zadvydas was deportable, because there was
no distinction in international law between excludable and resident
aliens, the decision in Gisbert was controlling 3-'
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit found that the Charming Betsy canon
of statutory construction dictated that the statute be construed to
avoid violating international law.324 The court held that customary
international law clearly prohibited prolonged arbitrary detention,
and noted further that the ICCPR, which the United States had
ratified, also prohibited arbitrary detention.-- Thus prolonged
detention of aliens without being charged likely violated international
law.3 26 Although the court noted that Congress could pass statutes
that would displace international law, it reasoned that where a statute
is ambiguous, it should be construed so as to comply with
international law. 7 Therefore, the court construed the statute to
authorize the detention of removable aliens only for a reasonable time
after the statutory detention period. In cases where there is no
reasonable likelihood of an alien being removed in the foreseeable
future, the court held that detention after the statutory removal
period is not authorized.32
These cases indicate that the circuit courts are currently divided
over whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231 authorizes the indefinite detention of
deportable aliens, and whether such detention violates the
321. See Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d. 279, 285 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing to
Gisbert v. United States Atty. Gen., 988 F.2d. 1437 (5th Cir. 1993)), cert. granted 121
S. Ct. 297 (2000) (No. 99-7791).
322. See Gisbert, 988 F.2d. at 1448.
323. See Zadvydas, 185 F.3d. at 285. The logic of this holding is elusive. The fact
that controlling executive, legislative and judicial acts dealing with excludable aliens
have displaced the international standard does not necessarily imply that the standard
has been displaced with regard to deportable aliens.
324. See Kin Ho Ma, 208 F.3d at 829-30; see also supra notes 191-94 and
accompanying text (discussing the Charming Bets), canon of statutory construction).
325. Kim Ho Ma, 208 F.3d at 829-30.
326. See i.
327. See id at 830.
328. Id at 830-31.
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Constitution and/or international law. Resolving these issues
potentially requires substantial clarification of several extra-
constitutional legal doctrines; the plenary power doctrine, the entry
fiction, the divide between civil detention and punishment, and the
applicability of international law are all implicated in the circuit
courts' decisions. These questions, and the continuing role of these
doctrines, are currently before the Supreme Court. Part III of this
Note argues that the doctrines used to exclude aliens from due process
protection stand on shaky ground, and should not be extended to
justify the indefinite detention of deportable aliens. Further, Part III
argues that indefinite detention of aliens violates international law
and jeopardizes the United States' efforts to encourage other
countries to comply with international human rights norms. Finally,
Part III argues that international law can inform due process analysis
resulting in uniform protections for aliens under the Constitution.
III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD PROHIBIT THE
INDEFINITE DETENTION OF ALIENS AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The indefinite detention of aliens under the IIRIRA, especially in
the case of resident aliens, raises substantial constitutional and
international law concerns. These questions have led to a split among
circuit courts regarding whether the detention provisions of the
IIRIRA authorize indefinite detention, and whether that detention
violates due process and/or international law.329 The Supreme Court
has granted certiorari in the cases of Kim Ho Ma v. Reno330 and
Zadvydas v. Underdown33' to resolve the controversy. In light of the
standards articulated by the Constitution and international human
rights law, this part argues that, rather than extend the legal fictions
which have allowed aliens to be detained indefinitely, the Supreme
Court should recognize aliens as persons entitled to due process
protection where a fundamental liberty interest, such as the right to be
free from detention, is implicated. This part also argues that
329. Compare id. at 821-22 (holding that the statute authorizes detention of
removable resident aliens only for a reasonable time and that indefinite detention of
resident aliens might violate due process and international law) with Duy Dac Ho v.
Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1053-56 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the statute authorizes
the indefinite detention of removable resident aliens and excludable aliens who have
been paroled into the United States and that such detention does not violate due
process) and Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 297 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that
the statute authorizes the indefinite detention of removable resident aliens and does
not violate due process), cert. granted 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000) (No. 99-7791). Cf Chi
Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 394-95 (3rd Cir. 1999) (holding that the statute
authorizes the detention of excludable aliens and does not violate due process). See
also supra Part II (analyzing the rulings of the circuit courts).
330. 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000) (No. 00-38).
331. 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000) (No. 99-7791).
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indefinite detention of aliens violates international law and, therefore,
the United States has an obligation to fulfill its international
obligations by enacting statutes that give effect to the treaty standards
to which it is a party. Failure to do so jeopardizes the United States'
influence on the development of international human rights law.
Finally, this part contends that international law norms can inform
due process analysis. Incorporation of international human rights
standards into United States constitutional law provides an evolving
understanding of which rights are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," '332 as well as guidance as to whom they should be extended.
A. Due Process
The constitutional justification for the indefinite detention of aliens
rests on a shaky foundation of legal fiction. Courts have relied on the
plenary power doctrine, the entry fiction, and the classification of
immigration detention as regulatory rather than punitive to prevent
aliens from claiming due process and equal protection under the Fifth
Amendment.333 Each of these justifications is of questionable validity.
The plenary power over immigration is not based on any specific
grant of power in the Constitution.3 - Academics have widely
criticized the plenary power in recent years, as might be expected of
judge-made law, especially when it is as harsh as the plenary power
doctrine.33 Specifically, commentators have called for the doctrine to
be restricted or overturned on a number of grounds, including: (1)
that the development of the doctrine is based on a misreading of
Supreme Court decisions;31 (2) that the doctrine is based on an
outdated understanding of immigration law as exclusively a means of
border control, and does not adequately take into account the
increased emphasis on post-entry social control in recent immigration
law;337 and (3) that the doctrine is based on an outdated understanding
of international law under which immigration matters involved solely
the rights of sovereign nations to control their borders, and thus
should be reevaluated because international law now provides
extensive protections for the rights of individual persons.s
332. Palko v. Conneticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937).
333. See supra Part I.B.
334. See Henkin, Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, supra note I11. at 858.
335. See infra notes 336-38 and accompanying text.
336. See VanderMay, supra note 111, at 165 (arguing that the cases credited with
establishing the plenary power doctrine, when read in context, do not stand for the
proposition that aliens do not get certain constitutional protections, but rather
address the allocation of power over immigration among the branches of the federal
government and the states).
337. See Kanstroom, supra note 39, at 1897-98.
338. See Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1361, 1369-75 (1999).
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Moreover, some argue that the lifting of controls over the flow of
information, capital and services that has come with globalization has
reshaped the nature of sovereignty and that the sanctity of borders is
no longer a valid proposition.339 For example, international norms
and structures now substantially modify the behavior of sovereigns.-"'
Subnational groups such as ethnic groups, tribes and regional bodies
within nation states are beginning to demand and receive more
autonomy and voice in state relations.341 Transnational populations of
immigrants and migrants have sprung up across the globe. 42 These
developments perhaps diminish, and certainly change, the meaning
and power of sovereignty in relation to how it was understood at the
time of the Asian exclusion cases.343
This change has important implications for the application of the
"foreign affairs exceptionalism on which the plenary power over
immigration is based.45 According to one scholar, the foreign affairs
power is under pressure in the United States from several sources.4 6
The increased involvement by states in foreign affairs, the Supreme
Court's renewed willingness to impose federalism restrictions on the
national government, and heightened skepticism of judicial
lawmaking all threaten the continued unfettered application of the
foreign affairs power.' 47 Without the justification of nineteenth
century notions of sovereignty, "foreign affairs exceptionalism" or of
any provision in the Constitution, there is little support for the claim
that the plenary power excludes aliens from due process protection.
Perhaps in light of these concerns, the Court has been careful not to
rely explicitly on the plenary power doctrine in recent immigration
cases, although the doctrine has not yet been overturned.' 8
339. See Saskia Sassen, Beyond Sovereignty: Immigration Policy Making Today, in
Immigration: A Civil Rights Issue for the Americas 15, 15-26 (Susanne Jonas & Suzie
Dod Thomas eds., 1999); cf T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Between National and Post-
National: Membership in the United States, 4 Mich. J. Race & L. 241, 241-62 (1999)
(arguing that individual rights and membership in the United States are generally
becoming more transnational, but that this indicates a shift toward a more
international world view, rather than a post-national world view).
340. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Sovereignty Studies in Constitutional Law: A
Comment, 17 Const. Comment. 197,202 (2000).
341. See id.
342. See id.
343. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text (discussing the development of
the plenary power cases involving the exclusion of Asian immigrants, and the role of
sovereignty in that doctrine).
344. Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev.
1089, 1096 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley, Foreign Affairs] ("Foreign affairs
exceptionalism is the view that the federal government's foreign affairs powers are
subject to a different, and generally more relaxed, set of constitutional restraints than
those that govern its domestic powers.").
345. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
346. Bradley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 344, at 1097.
347. See id. at 1097-1104.
348. See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
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Even if the plenary power doctrine is still valid, its reach is
limited 49 The Supreme Court has extended constitutional protection,
including due process, to resident aliens in deportation proceedings,"
and has indicated that even excludable aliens are afforded some
constitutional protection.35' Moreover, the Court has not allowed the
government to infringe on aliens' fundamental rights where the
infringement is tangential to the regulation of deportation or
exclusion. 2 In other words, the plenary power doctrine affords the
government a degree of deference in matters of immigration, and
supports an assumption that the government's interests in matters of
deportation are compelling. However, any infringement of an alien's
fundamental rights must still be narrowly tailored to the government's
interest.3  Any such infringement must be directly related to
exclusion or deportation, otherwise it will not fall under the shroud of
the plenary power. Thus, the Fifth Circuit's reliance on this doctrine
to justify the indefinite detention of deportable aliens is misplaced,
because the plenary power does not allow deportable aliens to be
deprived of fundamental rights without strict scrutinyY" Moreover,
when deportable aliens cannot be deported because their country of
origin will not accept their return, prolonged detention does not
substantially increase the likelihood of deportation. Thus detention in
such cases is tangential to the plenary power justification of enforcing
immigration policy. Although there may be an ancillary relation
between indefinite detention and enforcing immigration policy, that
relation is not narrowly tailored.
In addition, the cases articulating the strongest version of the
plenary power doctrine were decided during the height of the Cold
War, and relied substantially on the need to protect the nation from
the threat of Communism. 5  Perhaps realizing that the justification
349. See supra notes 116-45 and accompanying text.
350. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982); Shaughnessy v. United States
ex reL Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953); supra notes 115645 and accompanying text.
351. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (noting that the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments protect all persons within the territory of the United
States, without distinguishing between excludable and deportable aliens); supra notes
115645 and accompanying text.
352. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116-17 (1976); supra notes
1156-45 and accompanying text.
353. Another justification for this limit might be that the plenary power, as it is
based on the foreign affairs power, should be subject to at least the same limitations
as the treaty power. The federal government can make treaties that infringe on the
areas of regulation traditionally reserved to the states, but it may not enter into
treaties that infringe on individual rights protected by the Constitution. See supra
notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit's
reliance on the plenary power doctrine).
355. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 210 ("In the exercise of these powers, Congress
expressly authorized the President to impose additional restrictions on aliens entering
or leaving the United States during periods of international tension and strife."):
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for this robust application of the plenary power doctrine has passed,
more recent cases have sought to limit its application. 6 Extending
the plenary power to allow the indefinite detention of deportable
aliens would reverse this trend. Rather than being based on the fear of
an international coalition hostile to the United States, however, this
heightened version would be based on a desire to expel criminals from
the country and prevent them from committing further crimes. 357
These goals are essentially domestic concerns and do not implicate the
foreign affairs justifications of the plenary power. 8
The related entry fiction doctrine allows courts to withhold the
protections of the Constitution from excludable aliens who are
detained at the threshold of entry.3 9 Through this fiction, excludable
aliens are considered to be beyond the territory of the United States
even though they are physically inside the border, and, therefore,
beyond the reach of the Constitution."6 While the entry fiction is
firmly rooted in Supreme Court precedent with regard to excludable
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 535-36 (1952) ("We have no doubt that the doctrines
and practices of Communism clearly enough teach the use of force to achieve political
control to give constitutional basis, according to any theory of reasonableness or
arbitrariness, for Congress to expel known alien Communists under its power to
regulate the exclusion, admission and expulsion of aliens."); United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 546 (1950) ("The special procedure followed in
this case was authorized not only during the period of actual hostilities but during the
entire war and the national emergency proclaimed May 27, 1941. The national
emergency has never been terminated. Indeed, a state of war still exists." (citation
omitted)); supra notes 121-39 and accompanying text. The Court in Carlson gave an
indication of the perception in 1952 of the threat Communism posed to national
security:
The Communist movement in the United States is an organization
numbering thousands of adherents, rigidly and ruthlessly disciplined.
Awaiting and seeking to advance a moment when the United States may be
so far extended by foreign engagements, so far divided in counsel, or so far
in industrial or financial straits, that overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force and violence may seem possible of achievement, it
seeks converts far and wide by an extensive system of schooling and
indoctrination.
342 U.S. at 535 n.21 (quoting former 8 U.S.C. § 781(15)).
356. See supra notes 140-52 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 284 and accompanying text; see also Kanstroom, supra note 39,
at 1892.
358. This argument is also made by the ACLU, see Brief for the American Civil
Liberties Union and the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 27-30, Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000) (No. 00-38), available at 2000 WL 1890976,
and is further developed in the Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Affirmance at 6-13, Kim Ho Ma (No. 00-38), available at 2000 WL 1890987. On the
other hand, the government argues that because indefinite detention is the result of
foreign nations' unwillingness to accept the return of their nationals, the foreign
affairs justification of the plenary power is implicated. See Brief for Petitioners at 43-
44, Kim Ho Ma (No. 00-38), available at 2000 WL 1784982.
359. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
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aliens,3 61 it has never been applied to deportable aliens. To do so
would require equating the determination that an alien is deportable
with an exit from the country that removes that alien from the reach
of constitutional protections afforded to all persons within the
territory of the United States. 62 This would be an especially troubling
extension in light of Supreme Court cases which have held that actual
exits from the United States do not have this effect on resident aliens,
provided that the absence is brief." -
The notion that detention is regulatory rather than punitive in cases
where aliens are being deported and detained based on past criminal
conduct is also dubious.3" Immigration detainees subject to indefinite
detention are often housed in state and county prisons, with other
prison inmates, under conditions virtually indistinguishable from
those used to punish criminal conduct." 5 Detainees who are held in
INS detention centers face similar conditions. '  Moreover, these
detainees have been ordered deported as a result of criminal activity
and are held in detention based primarily on their criminal record.3 "7
Additionally, the relation between indefinite detention and the
regulatory purpose of the statute is suspect. Where an alien cannot be
deported because the United States does not have normalized
diplomatic relations with his or her country of origin, or because that
country refuses to take him or her back, prolonged detention bears
tenuous relation to the goal of effecting such deportation. Keeping
aliens in detention does not make it more likely that the impediment
to their deportation will be removed. Even if there is a relation,
indefinite detention under the aforementioned conditions is excessive
as a means of achieving this goal. Where civil penalties are similar to
punitive ones, and are insufficiently related to the regulatory purpose,
courts have held that the regulation is punitive and therefore they
require the constitutional protections afforded in criminal
proceedings.36
361. See Mezei 345 U.S at 215-16.
362. See Duy Dac Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045. 1061 (10th Cir. 2000) (Brorby, J.,
dissenting).
363. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (holding that a brief visit to
Mexico to smuggle aliens did not render a deportable alien excludable for due process
analysis upon return); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963) (holding that an
afternoon trip to Mexico did not render alien's return to the U.S. an entry for
immigration purposes).
364. See supra note 126 and accompanying text; see also Robert Pauw, A New
Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of tei Constitution's Criminal
Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 305, 307 (2t00).
365. See Cheryl Little, INS Detention in Florida, 30 U. Miami Inter-Am. L Rev.
551 (1999).
366. See id.
367. See, e.g., Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 398 (3d Cir. 1999).
368. See Pauw, supra note 364, at 323-24. Another way to ascertain whether a
sanction is punitive is to analyze it in relation to different theories of punishment.
Under one theory, punishment is defined by severity and the imposition of suffering.
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Extending these legal fictions to deprive deportable aliens of due
process protections would also implicate the Court in a troubling shift
in immigration law. The IIRIRA is one of several laws that have
sought to regulate immigration by limiting the civil rights of
immigrants.3 9  Immigration legislation in the late 1980s and early
1990s took a different approach, recognizing that immigrants come to
the United States primarily for jobs, and therefore imposed fines on
employers who knowingly employed illegal aliens. 370 Extending the
plenary power doctrine, the entry fiction, and civil indefinite detention
to cover deportable aliens would further deprive resident aliens of
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection that protect
all persons in the United States. Disturbing on its own, this result
takes on an insidious quality when viewed in light of the IIRIRA's
failure to penalize companies that willingly employ illegal aliens, and
provisions that ensure the admission of thousands of laborers to fill
low wage agricultural provisions.37' Viewed in this light, it could be
argued that the IIRIRA is an attempt to create a cheap and
vulnerable labor force, unprotected by even the minimum safeguards
of the Constitution that apply to all persons.7
While these legal fictions may have some validity based on
precedent when applied to excludable aliens, they do not justify
depriving deportable aliens of due process protection.3  Traditional
due process analysis would not allow for indefinite detention of
deportable aliens. Because the right to be free from detention is a
fundamental right, any infringement on this right must survive strict
scrutiny.374 The government's interest in cases involving the indefinite
detention of aliens have been articulated as first, effecting their
deportation, and second, protecting society from their potential
criminal activity.375  While these may be compelling government
See id at 325-26. Under another, punishment is a means of incapacitating individuals
so that they can not repeat their offense. See id. at 326. Punishment is also seen as a
means of rehabilitation, and retribution. See id. at 327-28. Each of these theories,
with the exception of rehabilitation, supports the notion that indefinite detention of
criminal aliens is punitive. This argument is also made in the Brief Amici Curiae of
the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc., Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center,
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and The Asian Law Caucus
in Support of the Judgement Below at 24-27, Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000) (No. 00-98), available at 2000 WL 1881916.
369. See Susanne Jonas et al., Introduction to Immigration: A Civil Rights Issue, at
vii, vii-viii (Susanne Jonas & Suzie Dod Thomas eds., 1999) [hereinafter Introduction
to Immigration: A Civil Rights Issue].
370. See Debra L. DeLaet, U.S. Immigration Policy in an Age of Rights 49-51
(2000).
371. Seeid. at 111-13.
372. See Introduction to Immigration: A Civil Rights Issue, supra note 369, at viii.
373. See supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
375. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 296-97 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000) (99-7791).
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interests, indefinite detention without a hearing is not a narrowly
tailored means. First, with regard to the purpose of effecting
deportation, there is not even a rational relationship between keeping
an alien detained and the possibility of establishing the ties with
governments such as Vietnam or Cambodia that would lead to those
countries accepting repatriation. Second, while indefinite detention
will certainly prevent further criminal conduct, it is by no means a
narrowly tailored means of effecting this result." While this type of
detention is allowed in our system of justice for the criminally insane
and as a sentence after trial for heinous crimes, it has never been
accepted as a way to control individuals who are deemed dangerous
by government officials.3' Moreover, once it is accepted that resident
aliens are afforded due process, 78 applying indefinite detention to
alien criminals raises equal protection concerns. Immigrants, who
cannot vote and are commonly targeted by xenophobic legislation, are
a "discrete and insular minorit[y]" subject to democratic process
breakdown.379 Indefinite detention applied to deportable aliens to
protect society is out of step with the punishment applied to non-
immigrants who may be just as dangerous to society, or more so.
These constitutional concerns justify the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
of the statute, which avoided serious constitutional questions under
the Ashwander doctrineSO
Even assuming that the indefinite detention of deportable aliens
could survive strict scrutiny review, the procedures under current INS
regulations and the proposed rules do not meet the requirements of
procedural due process. Civil detention involves a restriction on a
fundamental liberty interest and requires a high level of process.", As
with the detention of insane persons, deportable aliens should be
granted at least a hearing before they are determined to be a danger
to society.2
376. This argument is also made in the Brief for the Respondent at 23-27, Kim Ho
Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000) (No. 00-38),
available at 2000 WL 1891006.
377. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80-81 (1992).
378. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
379. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see supra
notes 105-09 and accompanying text; Lowell Sachs, Treacherous Waters in Turbulent
Times: Navigating the Recent Sea Change in U.S. Immigration Policy and Attitudes, in
Immigration: A Civil Rights Issue for the Americas 145, 145-56 (Susanne Jonas &
Suzie Dod Thomas eds., 1999).
380. See supra notes 62-63, 273-74 and accompanying text (discussing the
Ashwander doctrine and the Ninth Circuit's ruling).
381. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text. This argument is the focus of
the Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil Liberties
Union of Washington as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7-16, Kim Ho Ma
v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (20U() (No. 00-38),
available at 2000 WL 1890976.
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Excludable aliens face a tougher task when it comes to seeking
relief from indefinite detention. Their claim to the protections of the
Fifth Amendment is seemingly precluded by the Supreme Court's
ruling in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei 38 Arguably, the
ruling in Mezei was motivated by the threat of Communism, then
considered a national emergency." In the absence of such an
emergency, there is little justification for such a restrictive reading of
individual rights. The notions of the plenary power and the entry
fiction articulated in that case, however, have taken on a life of their
own, independent of the justification by which they were spawned.3 ,
Excludable aliens are considered beyond the reach of the
Constitution, although several of the previous arguments3 86 could
apply to excludable aliens as well, especially those who are paroled
into the United States. Importantly, though, excludable aliens
detained in the United States are not beyond the reach of
international law, which contains clear prohibitions against indefinite
detention as it is applied to both excludable and deportable aliens
under the IIRIRA.
B. International Law
Of the international law standards that potentially prohibit the
indefinite detention of aliens, the proscription against prolonged
arbitrary detention is the most explicit.3" The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, which is generally accepted as the enumeration of
the rights that states are obliged to promote under the U.N. Charter,
protects the rights of all persons to be free from arbitrary detention.3M
Although the U.N. Charter was held to be non-self-executing shortly
after its adoption, many argue that during the passing decades the
human rights protections of the Charter have become sufficiently
specific to elevate it to the status of self-executing.3 s9 The ICCPR also
clearly prohibits arbitrary detention.390 Although this treaty has been
declared non-self-executing by the United States, there is a strong
argument that such a declaration has no effect on a treaty like the
383. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). See supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
385. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982) (noting the lesser
status afforded to excludable aliens under the Constitution).
386. See supra notes 334-68 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 196-2456 and accompanying text (describing standards of
international law which are relevant to indefinite detention). For further argument
that the indefinite detention of aliens violates international law, see the Brief of
Amici Curiae Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Advocates, et al. in Support of
Respondent and Affirmance at 3-16, Kim Ho Ma (No. 00-38), available at 2000 WL
1890982.
388. See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 218-19 and accompanying text.
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ICCPR, which by its terms, is self-executing. 9 In any case, a clear
customary international law norm exists that prohibits prolonged
arbitrary detention."9 Even if the U.N. Charter and the ICCPR are
not domestically enforceable, customary international law would
ordinarily be directly enforceable in U.S. courts. 93
A precedent exists in United States courts, however, that principles
of international law can be overruled by subsequently enacted federal
statutes, and perhaps, executive and judicial acts.-" The IIRIRA was
enacted subsequent to the ratification of the U.N. Charter and the
ICCPR, as well as after the emergence of the customary international
law prohibition against prolonged arbitrary detention." In addition,
the Attorney General's promulgation of regulations that allow for the
indefinite detention of aliens might also prevent international law
from being applied.3 96
While an inconsistent statute or acts of the Attorney General might
preclude the direct domestic enforcement of international law, they
do not preclude application of international law in the interpretation
of an ambiguous statute. Thus, the IIRIRA's lack of specificity with
regard to the duration of time beyond the removal period should be
interpreted in a manner consistent with international law under the
Charming Betsy doctrine.397 This doctrine affords adequate respect to
the law of nations and assumes that Congress would not knowingly
place the United States in violation of that law without explicit
authorization.398 Where, as here, the Attorney General is acting
pursuant to authority granted by a congressional statute, she may not
act beyond the scope of that authority.
The Charming Betsy doctrine rests in large part upon an
understanding that the United States is bound internationally by the
provisions of international law.399  This obligation includes the
provisions of treaties that the United States has ratified but declared
non-self-executing.' By violating the terms of these agreements and
391. See VAzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 169, at 706-08 (noting that such
declarations conflict with the supremacy clause and the intent of other parties that the
treaty be self executing); supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
392. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
394. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
395. The IIRIRA was enacted in 1996, see supra note 6 and accompanying text, the
ICCPR was ratified in 1992, see supra note 218 and accompanying text, the
Restatement (Third) recognized the customary international law prohibition against
arbitrary detention at least as early as 1987, see Restatement (Third), supra note 153,§ 702, and the United States ratified the U.N. Charter in 1945, see supra note 196 and
accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
397. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804);
supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
399. Seesupra note 67 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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the standards of international custom, the United States distances
itself from the international community and loses a degree of
legitimacy in its endeavors to promote human rights. While the
United States routinely encourages and in fact demands that other
nations comply with the standards of the Universal Declaration and
the ICCPR, such exhortations ring hollow if the United States ignores
those standards at home. °1 Moreover, the United States' failure to
enforce standards domestically to which it is bound internationally
may set a troubling precedent for other nations that may wish to be
party to international treaties for political reasons, yet contemplate
only sham compliance.
The United States has two ways in which it could comply with
international law prohibitions against prolonged arbitrary detention.
First, it could simply put a time limit on immigration detention for
aliens who cannot be excluded or deported. In addition, the United
States could grant immigration detainees a hearing with counsel
present. These steps would satisfy international law standards and
address the concerns voiced by international bodies on indefinite
detention. The alternative is for courts to inform their constitutional
interpretations with an understanding of international law standards
by extending the full protections of the Fifth Amendment to
deportable and excludable aliens. °"
The second is the more compelling solution. Ensuring that both
excludable and deportable aliens who are present in the United States
are protected by due process would not only prevent detention from
being considered arbitrary, it would bring the United States in line
with international law standards that provide for the right to
personhood before the law, personal liberty and due process, and
equal protection.0 3 It would also remove the United States from the
morally questionable position of denying certain persons the
401. See e.g., Lillich, International Human Rights, supra note 223, 48 (noting that
the United States urged the International Court of Justice to condemn Iran for taking
hostages and thus violating fundamental human rights which all states have a duty to
uphold under the U.N. Charter (citing Memorial of the United States (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. Pleadings (Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran) 182 (Jan. 12, 1980))); Press Statement, James Rubin, Spokesman, Dept. of
State, State Department Hosts Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue with China (Jan. 11,
1999) available at http://secretary.state.gov (last visited Jan. 30, 2000) ("We will
address the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms through the rule of
law, including legal reform and due process. We will encourage China to ratify and
adhere to the [ICCPR] and other human rights instruments.").
402. See Lillich, Invoking International Law, supra note 154, at 408-12 (describing
how international human rights norms can infuse constitutional interpretation). A
related argument, that evolving international standards require a reevaluation of
Supreme Court precedent regarding excludable aliens, is made in the Brief for
Amicus Curiae of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in Support of
Respondent Kim Ho Ma at 15-19, Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000) (No. 00-38), available at 2000 WL 1881913.
403. See supra text accompanying note 244.
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fundamental rights protected by the Constitution, many of which are
considered universal to all human beings by the international
community. This alternative is attractive in that it is fully consistent
with United States constitutional jurisprudence, under which
freedoms implicit in the concept of ordered liberty can be determined
by looking to the traditions of other civilized societies."  In addition,
invoking international law to extend due process to all aliens in the
United States would avoid a dichotomy between the rights under
international law, afforded to aliens, and rights under the
Constitution, available only to citizens. 5  Applying international
standards to protect the rights of aliens, while reserving constitutional
protections for citizens, fails to recognize the stake that aliens have in
United States society: aliens work, pay taxes, and even serve in the
military. In addition, such a dichotomy would fail to recognize the
effect that a lower standard of rights for aliens would have on the
rights of citizens, because aliens are often the parents, children and
spouses of citizens.'
Aliens deserve, at least, those protections of the Constitution
available to all persons. The justifications previously relied on by
courts to deny aliens due process protection are of dubious origin and
of even more questionable validity in the twenty-first century.
Changing notions of sovereignty, the progression of globalization, and
the rise of international human rights norms require a reevaluation of
how the United States treats its immigrants. The United States has
also stated its intent to promote human rights norms and encourage
other countries to do the same. These factors should not be ignored
by the Supreme Court in deciding whether the indefinite detention is
permissible under United States law. In light of these factors, the
Court should not permit the INS to continue its policy of indefinitely
detaining aliens.
404. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
405. See Motomura, supra note 338, at 1390-92.
406. Justice Jackson recognized this connection in his dissent in United States ex rel.
Knauffv. Shaughnessy 338 U.S. 537,550 (1950) (Jackson, J. dissenting). He wrote:
I do not question the constitutional power of Congress to authorize
immigration authorities to turn back from our gates any alien or class of
aliens. But I do not find that Congress has authorized an abrupt and brutal
exclusion of the wife of an American citizen without a hearing....
Security is like liberty in that many are the crimes committed in its name.
The menace to the security of this country, be it great as it may, from this
girl's admission is as nothing compared to the menace to free institutions
inherent in procedures of this pattern.
Id. at 550-51; see also Motomura, supra note 338, at 1390-92. A similar argument is
made in the Brief of the American Association of Jews from the Former U.S.S.R., et
al. as Amici Curiae, Supporting Affirmance at 18-21. Kim Ho Mla (No. t0-38),




Unquestionably, the government has a compelling interest in
maintaining control over its borders and ensuring the safety of those
within its jurisdiction. However, these interests do not justify broad
restrictions, such as indefinite detention, that narrowly target persons
within a particular social class, such as immigrants. The U.S.
Constitution, through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
prohibits these types of restrictions in principle. International law not
only prohibits these types of restrictions, but specifically prohibits
prolonged arbitrary detention as well. The changing nature of
sovereignty and foreign affairs provide a provident opportunity for
the Supreme Court to take international law into account in
determining what constitutional protections will be afforded to aliens.
Indeed, such consideration is compelled by the United States' stated
policy of promoting human rights norms. The Supreme Court should
take the opportunity presented by the current circuit split to overrule
suspect doctrines, and extend the protections of the Constitution and
international law to aliens. At the very least, the Court should not
assume that Congress intended such a denial of due process without
explicit instructions.
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